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ABSTRACT 
This project contains the research area of Europeanization and how our selected EU member 
state has influenced the level of Europeanization through different initiatives. Europeanization 
is a theoretical concept which is applied to the level of EU politics. The theoretical concept 
consists of different approaches, and we have explained these and furthermore applied these 
approaches to the context of our project. We have selected a specific member state in order to 
limit our area of research. We have chosen Germany as we believe there are various 
examples of how this member state has contributed in promoting further Europeanization.  We 
have made use of two German-French declarations, the Berlin Plus arrangements and lastly 
assessed the German involvement in resolving the Macedonian conflict in 2001. We have 
made use of the tools provided by the theory and applied these to the specific examples 
emphasizing how Germany may have attempted to influence EU level politics. In the project 
we conclude that Germany has made several attempts to influence EU Foreign politics, in 
terms of securing their own security as well as the European security.  
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RESEARCH AREA 
Europeanization is a process that has been widely referred to in the science politics and 
particularly in addition to the European Union. The process has been described by many 
theorists, and we have chosen those of Patrick Muller & Nicole Alecu de Flers, Cini & 
Borragan, Olsen and Graziano & Vink. These theorists thoroughly present the process of 
Europeanization, both from a top-down and a bottom-up perspective. This lay the foundation 
for our further work, as we wish to gain a clear understanding how Germany has promoted 
Europeanization within the sector of Foreign policy of the European Union. It becomes evident 
that Europeanization can be traced in supranational sectors such as agriculture and economy. 
However in recent years the study of Europeanization has increased and along with it has its 
applicability to other policy areas. Reuben Wong suggests that “foreign and security policy is 
not immune to Europeanization” (Wong, 2005, p.37). We wish to examine whether the process 
of Europeanization is applicable to the sector of Security & Foreign policy. Prior to our analysis 
we will show the process of Europeanization can be vividly seen in the sector of Economy. 
Once we have clarified the influence of Europeanization within the economy sector, we will 
examine if and how the very same process can be traced in the sector of foreign and security 
policy. In order to limit our area of research we have chosen a specific EU member state and 
chosen to focus solely on Germany. We will examine how Germany has contributed to the EU 
Foreign & Security Policy, and conclusively find an answer to whether Europeanization has 
taken place in the EU sector of Foreign and Security Policy. 
 
 
Problem Formulation 
Has Germany participated in the Europeanization of CFSP? 
In order to answer our problem formulation we have added three working questions. These will 
refer to each part of analysis and thereby assist in answering the problem formulation. 
 
 
How is Europeanization exercised by the Council and Commission? 
We wish to gain an understanding of how the Council and the Commission may have an 
Europeanizing effect in terms of their institutional power. Firstly we will describe their basic 
powers and then we will explain these in regard to the approach of Europeanization. This will 
aid us in gaining a further understanding of Europeanization as the mentioned EU bodies can 
be instrumental in exercising Europeanization.  
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How is Europeanization useful? 
Olsen discusses the relevance of Europeanization and we believe this to be important in order 
for us to understand not only how Europeanization can be understood, but also how it can be 
applied and why it useful.   
 
How has Germany contributed to EU Foreign policy? 
We wish to discover how Germany actively participated in developing EU Foreign & Security 
Policy. We believe that certain German actions reflect advocating for further development in 
EU Foreign & Security Policy. We wish to gain a further understanding of the German 
capabilities in pushing forwards the EU and particularly the EU Foreign & Security Policy. In 
order to answer this question we will look at the German-French Joint letter, the Berlin plus 
arrangements, the German involvement in Macedonia and lastly the German-French 
declaration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
THEORY 
 
What is Europeanization? 
Academicians Graziano & Vink argue that we can perceive Europeanization as a relatively 
new theory. From their point of view the specialist on integration in between 1950’-1980’ did 
not need the word Europeanization as the vocabulary was sufficient to describe the ongoing 
processes. Change came with the end of decentralized governance promoted throughout the 
member states of the European Community. The traditional theories in integration were not 
applicable to the current issues. Furthermore the 1980’ brought in a much wider usage of 
majority voting. Therefore a much more significant amount of legislation and decisions was 
made in Brussels (Graziano & Vink, 2007, p. 24-25). The previous decentralization led to 
incoherent decision-making, which did not have a strong impact on supra nationalizing the 
politics. So for a shift from intergovernmental, mainly bilateral governing to supranational 
unified system changed the nature of integration (Ibid., p. 26). In terms of CFSP Graziano & 
Vink claim, that Europeanization lacks coherent authoritative decision-making center, therefore 
we are forced to rely on not really fluent cooperation or consulting of member states 
(Ibid.,p.322). 
Europeanization has been considered to be a very important theory in European integration 
researches for three fundamental reasons. To begin with, the European Union has not only 
managed to get involved in a wide variety of policies during the integration process for more 
than 50 years now, but it has a tremendous impact on the everyday lives of its members, as 
well. Secondly, the union exercises influence not only on member states themselves and their 
citizens, but also on other countries outside the union, who may or may not want to obtain a 
membership. So, the EU has been stimulating those countries to show sufficient developments 
of “market liberalization, democracy, human rights, and good governance”. Finally, we will see 
how European integration has exerted indirect impact on EU-countries as much as on non-EU 
countries, too (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p.408). 
For a start, Europeanization is seen to be a wide-discussed theory in the study of the 
European Union and European Integration. Furthermore, Europeanization represents the 
relationship between the EU and the member states and other countries outside the union. On 
the one hand, there are those Europeanization ideas that discuss the influence member states 
exercise upon the EU’s political developments. On the other hand, there are other 
Europeanization concepts explaining the dominance of the EU over member states and 
basically how the union prompts domestic change. Generally speaking, the three main 
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Europeanization concepts, recognized so far, are top-down Europeanization, bottom-up 
Europeanization and the the approach of combining of both top-down and bottom-up in one, 
which is also called cross-loading or integrative Europeanization. To understand these three 
principles and how they work we will provide a detailed description including the explanation 
how these approaches work in practice within the EU bodies (Cini & Borragan, 2010). 
 
 
The different dimensions of Europeanization process 
 
The following chapter is dedicated to the description of how Europeanization takes place on 
the grounds of the EU. In fact, there are two main dimensions in this Europeanization process. 
They are described by Nicole Alecu de Flers & Patrick Müller. The first one is called uploading 
and consists of a bottom-up dimension. The second one is called downloading and it is kind of 
top-down dimension (Alecu de Flers & Müller, 2010, p.8). 
The uploading dimension consists of a projection of the national policy preferences and 
models into the EU level through the mechanism of socialization, whereas the downloading 
one refers to the impact on the national policies made by the EU level (national policy 
changes, such as practices, rules, ideas, objectives…) through the mechanisms of 
socialization and learning (Ibid).The uploading dimension is particularly attractive for member 
states because they can project their own national preferences to EU level (Alecu de Flers & 
Müller, 2010, p.9). In other words this is called bottom-up Europeanization, which is the 
approach that explains how member states shape EU policy (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p. 407). 
From a social constructivist point of view, actors should be attracted to see each other as 
partners who have to solve, as a group, joint problems, rather than trying to negotiate as 
opponents in a bargaining hostile battles of interests. The preference uploading may also be 
an explanation to the success of smaller Member States in the influence of European foreign 
policy outcomes. We can take the example of the Nordic EU members, notably Sweden or 
Finland, that are known for having developed a strong influence in the implementation of the 
civilian dimension of ESDP, while as the same time  this uploading approach is also being 
used by the more influential states.  (Alecu de Flers & Müller, 2010,pp.10-11). 
Here, talking about the socialization Europeanization the theories vary as, for example Cini 
considers mechanisms of learning from the others to be a third type of Europeanization. We 
will describe his point later on as we will discuss the mixture of bottom-up and top-down 
approach. Moreover he sees this approach as most visible in terms of the Council, where the 
member states have to interact (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p. 122). The clash between these two 
perceptions can be seen as de Flers understands socializing as solely bottom-up process. 
While in contrast Cini sees that socializing is sort of a bottom-up interaction between member 
states, however at the European level he considers it to have a top down effect. 
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According to Cini & Borragan (2013, p.119), top-down Europeanization embodies the nature of 
influence the EU exercise upon member states. Top-down Europeanization is the expression 
used to explain and illustrate the mechanisms that are applied by the EU to promote changes 
in the member states (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p.409). The EU creates supranational norms 
that lead to a change in national system in order to adapt EU policy. When a new norm is 
agreed and it does not comply with the national norm, then downloading of the EU concerned 
policy has to be done by the member states (Ibid).This downloading depends on ‘’cost-benefit 
calculations’’ depending on the interests of the EU, the member states and the institutions and 
lobbies at both levels (Ibid). That means the impact of this process is not to uniform at all, as 
the level of adoption vary amongst the member states according to the differences between 
original and adopted law. Some countries are then for example better ‘’downloaders’’ than 
others (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p.411). That is the case of the Nordic countries of the EU, such 
as Denmark or Sweden (Ibid). 
 
 
In regard to the above mentioned, we find it essential to look at certain EU institutional 
activities towards Europeanization of EU policies through top-down effect. In order to see 
which EU policies are considered highly Europeanized, we decided to see what Cini and 
Borragan (2010) had to express about this issue. According to the theorists, Europeanization 
of economic policy might be more obvious than Europeanization of CFSP. A given example of 
that could be the establishment of the single market and the Commission’s role within it (Cini 
and Borragan, 2010, p. 254-266).  
 
 
Furthermore according to Cini there is a third important approach, called cross-loading 
Europeanization. This Europeanization process represents the reciprocal relationship between 
the ideas of both, the EU and its members. This approach combines the bottom-up and top-
down and it focuses on how EU countries influence EU policy-making, how the EU 
communicates with member states and how nationals react to EU policies. This approach 
seeks to explain both the uploading and downloading dimension of EU politics. The member 
states are not passive takers of domestic change caused by the EU, however at the same time 
they must adapt to the pressure exercise by the EU. Thus this approach is combined by both 
the bottom-up and top-down approach (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p.407). Moreover the theory 
states that the member states who possess the power and capacity to upload their 
preferences have experienced less difficulties with downloading the EU preferences. In other 
words the more efficient a member state is in shaping EU policy, the fewer problems it faces 
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when downloading these policies. However, it is worth mentioning that this approach is the 
least studied approach and few attempts has been made to bring these together (Cini & 
Borragan, 2013, p. 123). 
To conclude on Europeanization dimensions, we have to keep in mind that Europeanization is 
a complicated phenomenon. Here we refer to Olsen (2007) who says that it is hard to define 
borders between Europeanization approaches since research methods are limited (Olsen, 
2007, p. 68). With respect to our research area we include de Flers’s & Müller’s opinion on 
Europeanization of CFSP.  
 
 
 
 
Is Europeanization really useful? 
 
To answer this question, we want to investigate what Olsen (2007) states in his theory and 
hereby connect it with our own perspectives. We find his opinion to be valuable because his 
arguments assist us in gaining further understanding of Europeanization and therefore we 
have chosen to include his work. Initially, we will emphasize how he describes 
Europeanization, and then we will focus on two Europeanization interpretations, which we 
believe are interconnected and helpful for our project. Finally, we will try to answer whether 
Europeanization is actually useful or not. 
 
To begin with, Olsen (2007) claims that Europeanization is, without a doubt, a very prominent 
theory in the study of European integration. However he also asks if Europeanization is good 
enough to comprehend all the modern changes that EU law is enduring nowadays. Also, the 
author is afraid that Europeanization might not be as well-known as the literature suggests. 
Therefore, the changes that Europeanization brings along might not be understood very 
objectively. Based on this, we want to highlight the confusions one may get while trying to 
identify Europeanization signs in certain policy making. Moreover, we believe that Olsen may 
have a point because the surrounding environment is constantly changing along with national 
reactions. Thus, to be able to identify these changes, one will need updated methods 
according to the given changing environment. 
 
Through the different literature we have witnessed that Europeanization is used by many 
researchers to illustrate different changing characteristics. Despite the fact that 
Europeanization is a famous concept, it does not have a certain definition because the 
methods used to investigate the theory are lacking flexibility and more open-minded 
approaches. However, we agree with Olsen that the concern is not what exactly 
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Europeanization is but rather if and how it can help us to comprehend the existing fast growing 
changes about European policy-making (Olsen, 2007, p.68). We see these growing changes 
applied to the sector of EU foreign policy. 
On the other hand, we have witnessed how other researchers have tried to describe 
progresses of integration in the last decades with examples of a change in voting systems 
within EU bodies. For example, Graziano states that the change from unanimity to majority 
voting system in the Commission eased the decision-making in many areas, including the area 
of foreign policy. In the analysis we will show a change of the voting system has contributed to 
increase Europeanization (Graziano & Vink,  2007, p.24-25). 
If we take into consideration what we have mentioned previously, the information of 
Graziano´s description leads us back to Olsen.  He argues that Europeanization might not be 
the ultimate cause for political changes. Furthermore he believes that policy adjustments 
highly depend on national principles and Europeanization is just one of those principles 
(Olsen, 2007, p.69). We find this argument to be interesting because it reveals the influence of 
national history and values over EU policy-making. That makes us question whether 
Europeanization and national ideas have gradually merged into one phenomena and that 
seems to be hardly explainable. Nevertheless, one could argue that the Europeanization 
concept has evolved in time, bringing along different policy changes. 
 
Above all, we agree that although Europeanization deserves the attention of researchers in the 
study of European integration, the theory may not be as useful as it seems. This is due to the 
premature and lack of methods to study the phenomena. Additionally, this does not imply that 
researches of Europeanization should be left out. On the contrary, in order to get more 
adequate results of the role Europeanization plays in European integration, the field should be 
studied with modern approaches. Those approaches should be historically unbiased and more 
appropriate to investigate European current change (Olsen, 2007, p.69-70). According to 
Olsen (2007), there are five different changing interpretations of Europeanization. Each 
interpretation embodies different elements of what is changing.  Olsen (2007) argues that the 
separated perspectives of Europeanization complement one another because they embody 
different but connected phenomena. So the five Europeanization phenomena, which 
distinguish what exactly is changing, are: “changes in external boundaries; developing 
institutions at the European level; central penetration of national systems of governance; 
exporting forms of political organization; and a political unification project” (Olsen, 2007:70-71). 
We are going to focus our attention on the following two Europeanization interpretations which 
are developing institutions at the EU level and central penetration of national systems of 
governance.  
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Developing institutions at the EU-level 
Since our interests are in the interaction between member states and EU, we want to 
investigate how top-down Europeanization influences the affected member states during EU 
policy-making. Olsen (2007, p. 76) explains that this particular interpretation focuses on how 
nationals participate in collective actions to reach common EU decisions. Here, the domestic 
initiative for possible EU-level changes would be a matter of national intentions. Additionally, 
Olsen believes that states will try to make a change based on their priorities and interests. 
Therefore possible institutional modifications, during EU policy shaping, are perceived as a 
desired process fostering national ambitions (Olsen, 2007, p.76-77).  
 
In addition, member states are willing to suggest possible changes in order to solve a current 
problem or problematic situation. While doing so, they will try to make changes that will bring 
the best results for everybody involved. According to Olsen (2007, p. 77) nationals believe that 
improved results can be achieved when they work together, rather than individually. Moreover, 
states consider the EU as an appropriate tool to help them satisfy their national ideas. In that 
specific matter, member states are willing to agree upon mutual ideas in the name of common 
approaches. 
With regard to the statement above, we believe that EU policy making is influenced by national 
motives. Here we can recall that Europeanization is not an unique phenomena but rather 
another concept explaining certain policy changes. In addition, we also mentioned that 
nationals act upon their principles and Europeanization might be just one of them (Olsen, 
2007, Ibid). 
 
According to Olsen (2007), the big EU countries who have a certain power, are the ones 
bringing the most significant changes in EU policies. An identified reason for this is the fact 
that those countries have the capacity to negotiate and influence EU law. However, European 
integration may embody as much unification as disunification. In that respect, Olsen argues 
whether the power used by member states is to foster Europeanization, or to distinguish 
themselves from the others as an unique body, or both aspects taken together. So, it is 
evident that the EU law-making has to deal with possibilities of both, integration and 
disintegration national initiatives (Olsen, 2007, p.77). 
Moreover, certain discussions believe that the EU is an unique and successful actor. However, 
those beliefs also question the core of progressive EU developments. 
 An example could be the roles of certain member states when trying to shape EU-law and 
whether these roles are of actual importance.  
Here, since the most powerful EU countries have a better position to influence EU policies, we 
could question whether the given influence is sufficient or irrelevant (Olsen, 2007, p. 77). 
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Maybe that could be understood by looking at practical cases with the enforcements of EU 
law. In this way we might distinguish whether given decisions have good practical results or 
not. In case, decisions do not change a problematic situation, then they would be obviously 
considered insufficient. 
One way to understand national motives for change could be determined by looking at how 
different institutions, such as the EU, EFTA, and NATO are established. This implies that the 
goals of certain organizations embody the inherent beliefs of their creators. Another argument 
is that the EU is considered to be a ‘non-state’. In that regard, the union deals with different 
policy spheres and each of them have different characteristics. Therefore, in order to 
understand the union as an actor, one might need to pay particular attention to the different 
dynamics of the diverse EU policy scopes (Olsen, 2007, p. 78).  
The purpose of EU policy developments is not only to focus on making new decisions and 
govern the EU law-making processes, but another goal is to change national beliefs, 
perceptions and values toward acceptance of EU law (Olsen, 2007). Here, it might be worth 
mentioning that Europeanization of EU policies implies modification of national ideas toward 
commonly approved ones. We believe that Olsen (2007) might have a reasonable point 
because what would be the value of a certain policy if nationals are not able to recognize it 
and take advantage of it? It would not make sense if the EU makes decisions merely for the 
sake of doing so, but rather, it makes decisions to satisfy the common values and thus bring 
the EU common desired results out of them. However, we find it interesting to comprehend 
whether nationals involvement within the EU policies is triggered by the EU ambitions or by 
national ones. Certainly, member states would be involved, to some extent, in EU decision-
making, but is it the EU itself who makes the nationals Europeanize EU policies or is it 
nationals’ ideas involved in the process? We can answer that question by choosing to look at 
the following, second Europeanization perspective. 
 
Central penetration of national systems of governance 
According to Olsen (2007), central penetration of national systems of governance is another 
interpretation of Europeanization. From the five different perceptions this Europeanization 
perception is considered to be the most widely studied. The researches on this particular 
phenomenon have focused on how the EU developments influence member states and how 
those states react to European-level pressure (Olsen, 2007, p.79).  
We think this particular perception is relevant to us because it reveals how Member states 
react to EU changes. Since our focus is on German participation in Europeanizing CFSP, we 
believe that looking at institutional changes may help us understand their motives for change. 
Also, the five Europeanization interpretations complement one another, although they present 
different aspects of change. For that specific reason, we think that it may be helpful if we don’t 
limit our scope only to one. Additionally, in order to understand one of them we may need to 
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look at another and see how exactly they complement each other. This approach would be 
useful for us to answer the problem formulation later on. 
Having stated that, we want to further emphasize why this particular Europeanization concept 
deserves our attention. Since the concept deals with national attitude toward EU-level 
decisions, we want to see why exactly states would pay attention to the union in the first place. 
Do member states have good enough reasons to participate in EU-law shaping or not? If they 
don’t, obviously they would not participate either. If they do have, however, we would like to 
see how sufficient those reasons are. So, for that particular reason, we wish to understand the 
possibilities of national motives and their attempts to be involved in EU policies developments.  
To explain the nature of this Europeanization concept, Olsen (2007) argues that one needs to 
look at national ‘experiential learning’ and ‘competitive selection’. If we want to understand 
national changes through looking at experiential learning, the main focus would be on the 
experience states have. Here, the nature of domestic change will depend on the positive or 
negative responses toward previous changes. So, the purpose of states would be, based on 
their experience, to make improvements and avoid past mistakes. This means, that states will 
most likely repeat doing what brings them success and avoid what doesn't (Olsen, 2007, p.79). 
On the other hand perceptions about ‘competitive selection’ involve domestic changes 
influenced by the surrounding environment. In this case, the environment is changing 
constantly, but the institutions and other involved actors are usually fixed. Therefore, in order 
to survive, states will try to be innovators and high competitive. Thus, only those institutions 
who can manage to adapt fast to the changing environment are most likely to keep existing 
(Olsen, 2007, p.80). 
Furthermore, one can hardly determine fixed responses of nationals toward the EU law 
developments. An obvious reason for this is the differences between EU policies (Olsen, 
2007). In that context, decisions made at EU-level have various impacts on member states. 
Since we already explained states to be different from each other, it is obvious that they will 
react differently to EU decisions. Having said that, we believe that EU countries, in order to 
survive and be competitive, will try to avoid possible incompatibilities with EU policies. 
Therefore, in order to do so, nationals need to be in close relation to EU decision processes, 
and thus influence EU law in accordance with national ideas. By doing this, states will try to 
avoid having undesired reactions toward EU decisions. These findings seem very interesting, 
because it helps us understand why member states would try to influence EU policies. After 
reading the Olsen literature it has become apparent to us that the desire to survive and be 
respected among others is a strong national value which encourages domestic initiatives 
within the EU. Does it mean that member states, in that respect, are willing to express national 
solidarity toward one another in order to survive? We believe that this might be true as the 
member in some cases attempt to Europeanize EU policies. This will be emphasized further in 
the analysis, by using several of German attempts to Europeanize EU foreign policy. 
15 
 
 
Besides the aspect of survival, national responses to EU law may be seen also as an aspect 
of domestic historical values. In that context, member states who want to protect their own 
historical values may be immune from EU law influences (Olsen, 2007, p.81). This means that 
such countries may try to influence the EU decisions in a way to satisfy their national historical 
ideas.  We find it interesting to see whether historical values are a good enough motive for 
states to participate in EU policies. In connection to this, CFSP is highly influenced by 
nationals. On the other hand, Germany is considered to be one of the oldest EU countries with 
strong historical values. Does it mean that Germany would attempt to influence CFSP in order 
to protect its historical values? To answer this question, we think it would be interesting to look 
at German background in relation to CFSP and how the country contributed to CFSP 
developments. 
Furthermore, Olsen (2007) claims that Europeanization of EU law does not necessary 
Europeanize national believes but rather the opposite. Also, he argues that policy changes at 
EU-level make domestic identities even stronger. In our own opinion, the author may have a 
point if national’s attempts to influence EU law are successful. Therefore the hunger for 
national identity may be seen as a good reason to stimulate states to participate actively in the 
development of EU policies.  
Moreover, Olsen (2007, p.82) believes that the EU law, through Europeanization, aims to help 
member states follow one common pattern. This was supposed to coordinate nationals and 
help them develop with respect to each other. The EU desired to Europeanize its policies 
aimed to prevent conflicts between states and thus, create a more stable and peaceful 
environment attempting to keep the involved parts satisfied.  
 
However, what the union may have not predicted are the different responses by nationals 
toward Europeanization of EU policies. Even though, the pattern the same, the involved actors 
would understand it differently, based on their national inherent ideas and values. However, 
national ideas are not fixed because they evolve through international interactions and 
dependence (Olsen, 2007, p.82). In our opinion, this implies that, if states feel insecure about 
certain EU policy spheres, their ideas will change toward getting more beneficial results for the 
states. In that context, some EU policies may be seen as much more Europeanized than 
others. For instance, we could distinguish the different Europeanization levels between CFSP 
and economic policy. Yet, the point here is not to compare but rather to understand why 
different EU policies would be Europeanized differently. 
 
To conclude, we have looked at Olsen’s opinion about Europeanization. Also, we have 
discussed the two Europeanization interpretations and their importance for our work on this 
project. In that context, we have seen that the union aims to make member states 
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Europeanize EU policies. However, we have also emphasized that those states possess their 
own capabilities for doing so. Nevertheless, it’s worth mentioning that, the interaction between 
the EU and the member states is influenced by the concept of Europeanization. However, 
Europeanization may not be as well understood as some would argue. Yet, we find that it 
deserves our attention, and thus be useful, because it might help us understand, to some 
extent, national principles and motives within the EU developments. Conclusively, we 
acknowledge the fact that Europeanization does not have an absolute definition and therefore 
might be complicated to comprehend. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
 
CONTEXT 
 
In the following chapter we wish to provide the necessary context in terms of Europeanization 
of CFSP and German contribution to this process. To start from the beginning we will firstly 
include a section on the EU institutions in relation to Europeanization. We find it important 
both, for reflection of the prior theories of Europeanization to practice and for easier orientation 
in our analysis. In the research chapter we plan to refer to the institutional influence on 
Europeanization, too. Moreover, this respective part distinguishes between Europeanization 
approaches, what is useful for understanding the member state´s possibilities on 
Europeanization.  
 
The second section of context chapter will be dedicated to Europeanization in economy. With 
this, our target is to show how the success of Europeanization varies according to the EU 
institutions. Furthermore, according to Olsen it is important to include examples to show the 
little differences that in the end help us to understand. 
 
The third section will elaborate German foreign affairs and its attitude towards CFSP. We have 
no doubts, that this historical background is crucial for gaining knowledge, which is necessary 
to consistently follow the project. Moreover we aim our research on German participation in 
European integration. Therefore, we argue that knowledge of development of German foreign 
policy during the second half of the last century and the beginning of our century is 
indispensable. 
 
In the last section of our context we focus on the development of the CFSP. The necessity of 
this background is indisputable. First of all, we focus on Europeanization of CFSP, therefore 
we need to know, what it is. Secondly, the CFSP development is connected with German 
foreign policy and we wish to provide coherent and full information. Eventually, in our analysis 
we will refer to either institutional development or German attitude towards European foreign 
policy in time. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
 
 
European Institutions in regard to Europeanization approaches 
 
To complement the explanation of Europeanization approaches we will include a brief 
description of European bodies and their procedures. By doing so we wish to reflect the 
differences between top-down and bottom-up Europeanization and their combination, 
socialization, in practice among EU policies. We find it vital for our understanding of 
Europeanization of CFSP as the policy-making is quite specific within the EU. Knowing from 
Cini’s book that CSFP is a matter of the Council we will focus mainly on its functioning (Cini & 
Borragan, 2013, p. 143). To highlight the unique nature of CFSP we will also include a 
description of the Commission and include an example of how the Commission Europeanized 
the sector of Economy. With this example we want to stress the differences in efficiency of 
Europeanization approaches. It is worth mentioning that we are fully aware of the 
incomparability of these two policy areas due to their nature. 
To begin with, we learned that each institution has its competencies given by the treaties, but 
we acknowledge that they are bound to cooperate and communicate. Inherently, we previously 
mentioned that every one of them has their unique role. The Commission is much more 
involved in economic integration as it functions as the leading actor in this field. While on the 
other hand the Council has much more to do with integration in foreign affairs (Europa.eu, 
2013). 
 
 
The Council 
First of all we refer to the Council, with regard to bottom-up concept of Europeanization which 
is, as we will see later, the most important institution in terms of CFSP. For further explanation 
of this concept seen by Cini we move on to the Council itself. 
The EU Council is the body representing national Government´s approaches and interests in 
both the legislative and executive processes. It is formed by Member State´s Ministers who 
meet at the ground of the Council to discuss and eventually approve the legislative changes in 
the EU system. This institution therefore meets to adopt laws and coordinate national policies. 
Since these meetings are occupied by Ministers from each country, who are signed for the 
particular policy area which is being discussed. Therefore, the participants of the meeting 
change with every other negotiation. The Chair goes to the Minister of currently presiding 
country, according to the EU rotating Presidency system (Consilium.europa.eu, 2013). This is 
to secure the smaller member states are not disadvantaged. There is one exception in this rule 
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and it is the matter of Foreign Affairs. Foreign policy area is headed by High Representative. 
This person, currently Lady Ashton (Ibid.) is leading the Foreign Affairs Ministers from Union´s 
countries when the CFSP and related matters are being reviewed. 
Ordinarily, the decision is being taken by qualified majority voting while each country is 
represented by a given number of votes reflecting the population. It has to be made clear that 
the votes are divided in favor of smaller countries, yet still not to disadvantage the bigger 
states. Furthermore, in decisional matters of external affairs or security, unanimity has to be 
reached to approve such decision (europa.eu, 2013). 
This voting process provides national approach to every policy area or piece of legislation. On 
the other hand, the Council does not operate solely on the basis of the ministerial delegations 
work. Other permanent working groups, providing the background materials are employed, 
under the Council. These groups are formed by national specialists and administrators 
officially called the Committee of Permanent Representatives also known as COREPER (CIni 
& Borragan, 2013, p.145). 
It is indisputable that the Council is the most significant representative of bottom-up 
Europeanization. On the other hand even the third type of the Cini’s Europeanization concept, 
called cross-loading or “socialization”, is visible within this institution (Cini & Borragan, 2013, 
p.143-144). To support the statement it has to be reminded that most of the staff and 
representatives working under the Council are nationals who advocate for their respective 
countries. In this regard we may say that they are bringing the domestic or national legislative, 
policies, customs, interest etc. at the European level (europa.eu, 2013).  
To conclude, in relation to the CFSP the Council has a significant position. This could be seen 
as a sort of mediating role as it provides the ground for equal discussion between the member 
states (Cini & Borragan, 2010). 
 
The Commission 
As we mentioned previously, the top-down Europeanization concept embodies the EU´s 
influence over member states. By studying this approach we wish to discover how the union 
triggers domestic changes for the purpose of the European integration. In the book of Cini it is 
argued that top-down Europeanization is being exercised mainly by the Commission, which 
therefore possesses significant responsibility in certain policy-making areas. One of the most 
representative examples of this influence is economy, as we will focus in a section later. In 
contrast to bottom-up perspective, downloading is being seen when member states adopt and 
implement common European legislatives into their domestic policies. This approach also 
requires that the European Union stimulates its members to give up on their national interests 
and beliefs in order to promote support of the EU decisions and activities as one whole (Cini & 
Borragan, 2010,p.131). 
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To begin with further explanation of top-down approach we include one example of, from our 
point of view, Europeanized policy area. Before we move on to the example of economic 
integration, we will include a brief description of the Commission, to point out its internal 
activities and how this EU body works. We find this knowledge necessary to be able to 
distinguish between Europeanization approaches at the institutional level. 
With focus on the Commission, we have to recall that it is one of the main decision-making 
institutions within the EU. Amongst other competences the Commission is responsible for the 
European integration. Having said this we assume that according to the mentioned fact, the 
EU Commission represents the common European interests. The list of competences include 
influence in various areas as e.g. policy and law initiation, overseeing implementation of EU 
law by the member states, management of the EU funds or even the external relations (Cini & 
Borragan, 2010, p.130.). 
The Commission´s position as an integration promoter in terms of establishing truly 
Europeanized policies is given by the fact that it consists of 28 Commissionaires. Each 
commissioner is native to one member state and is elected for five-year term. Furthermore, 
each of them is responsible for different policy area. The Commission also has a President. 
The Commission on the other hand does not consist only of the 28 Commissionaires, but for 
day-to-day running of the EU it employs additional staff (Consilium.europa.eu, 2013). 
To illustrate that the Commission represents the common interests of the union we have to 
emphasize that the Commissioners do not advocate for their respective countries. Moreover 
they have competences each within their specific policy area they are signed for. From our 
point of view this makes the Commission the primary European institution which acts for 
convergence and further modifications of national policies by introducing common legislative 
(Cini & Borragan, 2010, p. 132). 
It is worth mentioning, that in economic integration and Single Market development, along with 
other policy areas, the European Commission is exercising the top-down process. We 
describe its involvement in European integration as follows: after the Commissioners agree on 
a concrete version of law, the Commission proposes the new piece of legislation to the Council 
or the Parliament as one unified body led by 28 European politicians who agreed on the 
particular legislation regardless their nationality. It should be no wonder that under these 
conditions the Commission is the best environment for so called ‘socializing’  of the interests 
 (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p. 130-131). As stated in previous chapters, the theory of socializing 
is the third type of Europeanization. This occurs when European politicians adopt international 
approaches during interacting and cooperating in one institution, department or office 
(Graziano & Vink, 2007, p.324-325).        
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Focusing on the foreign affairs, defense and Common Foreign and Security Policy the 
Commission has a special role to play. Besides assessing applications for membership and 
introducing new criteria for accession, the Commission also has the competence to represent 
the European Union as one single body and it acts on behalf of all the countries. This 
nevertheless applies only to negotiating on international agreements or economic relations 
with the external actors. On the other hand, the Commission is not in charge of deploying 
European troops neither launching any missions nor representing ‘European’ approaches in 
the world affairs. Furthermore, one of the Commissionaires is titled the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. This post was originally introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, even though it was called the High Representative of Foreign and 
Security Policy. The recent title was established with the Lisbon Treaty and represents the 
main coordinator of the European CFSP. The so called Foreign Minister of the EU is 
authorized with the representative competencies in the foreign policy area and she participates 
at the Council meetings. Moreover the High Representative interacts with other EU bodies, 
namely the Council (Cini & Borragan, 2013, p.138.). 
 
Apparently, the Commission exercises top-down policy-making as it initiates European 
legislative which binds and applies to all member states in the same way. This is to secure 
unity and equal conditions within the EU´s borders. The representation is not national but 
sectorial, what does not leave much room for national interest (europa.eu, 2013). Last but not 
least the willingness to implement common rules introduced by a supranational institution 
influences the level of integration and convergence among member states. Therefore, it 
indisputably speaks for the Commission´s role as an integration and moreover an 
Europeanization leader. 
              
Conclusion 
We wish to conclude this part on basis of the literature that we have read and information the 
European Union provides on its official websites. To sum up this chapter is dedicated to the 
legal roles of the European institutions in terms of Europeanization. As we have emphasized in 
the section of the Council, it is mainly the member states who create new legislation. In 
contrast to this the Commission represents the influence of the European Union itself on its 
members (Graziano & Vink, 2007, p. 322). 
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To refer directly to CFSP, it is considered to be a sensitive area where Member states 
exercise certain autonomy. Therefore adopting common policy created with top-down 
approach is hardly enforceable. Since we have seen that the Commission mainly has a top-
down effect on EU politics, the effect on CFSP is not very visible as it is the member states 
who are affected by the top-down Europeanization. In contrast to the Commission´s little effect 
on CFSP it is substantial to mention that in worldwide context the Commission is one of the 
most authorized bodies of the EU.  
 
Finally, we move to the Council, where we have learned, that considering its members, staff 
and activities, it exercises mostly the bottom-up and even the cross-loading approach. 
Moreover, the Council is entitled to bring national attitudes at the EU level and throughout 
numerous negotiations decide on a new action in this aspect. This is relevant in regards to the 
CFSP which can be affected by national opinions. 
 
Europeanization in Economy 
 
As we emphasized previously, the influence of Europeanization can be seen in various policy 
areas. While referring to the Commission and its top-down Europeanization influence on the 
union´s politics we witnessed that economy is a good example of how this approach works in 
practice. Therefore we will dedicate the next chapter to the development of European 
economics. We are using this example to clarify further what top-down Europeanization is in 
practice. Moreover, we saw in Olsen´s theory that it is essential to give an example of how 
other policies have developed differently. That, on the other hand, helped us understand the 
specific nature of CFSP in contrast to the economy policy. However, our aim is not to compare 
them, but rather to get an idea of what factors are involved in the Europeanization of CFSP 
and how those factors make CFSP different from the economy policy. Eventually, it is clear 
from previous chapters, that we are fully aware that CFSP and economy are being discussed 
in different EU institutions and the conditions for decision-making in these areas are more than 
just slightly different. With focus on EU economics we wish to relate the theories to what has 
been done in reality and how it works. Moreover this reflection helps us to connect the role of 
EU bodies, member states and effects of different approaches in the context of a real union. 
Therefore, we will look at the Europeanization of the EU policy in the economic sector and how 
the Commission has participated in doing so. It must be mentioned that we do acknowledge 
that the sector of Economy has different tools available and therefore we do not wish to to 
compare the sector of Economy with the sector of Foreign policy. However we merely wish to 
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gain an understanding of how signs of Europeanization can be traced in the sector of 
Economy.  
The European Union’s economic power could be argued to be one of the most significant 
powers worldwide. According Graziano & Vink (2007, p 281-282), the European economic 
influence is considered to be quite significant, because of its stability, mobilization, solidarity 
and also most importantly, because of its effectiveness in solving global economic issues. The 
EU’s economic successfulness would not be what it is nowadays without the efforts of member 
states to give up their sovereignty to the union for the common benefits of the economic 
sector. Thus, nationals had to go through changes in regard to their domestic economic 
policies and comply with the union’s economic requirements to achieve common profit. 
 
 
Although, the economic policy is seen to be highly Europeanized, that process has not always 
been fluent without obstacles. For example, the establishment of the Common Commercial 
Policy had the purpose to create internal coordination of the EU’s commercial policies. 
Additionally, it constructed strategies and rules for the EU’s external actions. However, the 
internal and external elements in relation to the Common Commercial Policy have caused 
tension and slow progress. These policy development difficulties are apparent due to the fact 
that member states have not been completely willing to abandon certain domestic ideas for the 
common economic benefits. Another reason could be also the fact that some nationals have 
strong historical values and principles. Furthermore, the decisions that needed to be made 
about the Common Commercial Policies were the union´s responsibility, where the 
Commission played an important role as an initiator. However, during the years the nature of 
the world trade has been changing and the union had to adapt to those changes in order to get 
the so desired successful economic results (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p 337-338). 
Due to the common understanding of the economic sector, the union has been able to enforce 
some European common legislation in the economic sector.  
The economic problems that the union has been facing helped to some extend to mobilize 
different domestic interest for the purpose of common economic benefits, where the EU played 
a role as a persuasive and coordinating actor (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p 338). 
The establishment of the Single market aimed to harmonize national preferences of member 
states and to create more favorable economic environment. This had the purpose to satisfy 
the involved actors.  
Therefore, mutual recognition played a significant role in the creation of national mobilization 
and solidarity. Moreover, the main contribution to economic success was considered to be the 
fact that member states perceived better economic results through the union’s leadership 
rather than to operate independently. (Cini & Borragan, 2010, p. 262). 
24 
 
Nowadays we see that the economic policies of member states are much more Europeanized. 
Europeanization is seen in the fact that member states gave up on their traditional policy 
instruments for the benefit of better economic growth. Here we see that the EU acted as a 
guide helping to reach common goals. The most important events causing changes were the 
establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) after 1978, then the Single European 
Act of 1987 followed by the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 and finally, the establishment of the 
Eurozone in 1999. Apparently, all of these were results of common decisions, while we had 
seen that member states were pressured by the EU demands coming from the Commission. 
These challenged domestic economic policy structures, methods and instruments and 
eventually led to changes. The results of all the changes proved to be positive as the single 
market and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) developed a stable and unified market 
(Graziano & Vink, 2007, p 282). 
The European Union´s economic rules, European single market and EMU represented the 
scope and conditions of Europeanization. Member states had to follow those conditions and 
implement them into their national economic policies and strategies (Graziano & Vink, 2007, p 
282). The design of EMU was aimed to achieve European common price stability and 
sustained economic growth as it was considered to improve the conditions within the 
European market. In the end this idea proved to be right and the strategy worked.  
The EMU’s design is seen to have great implications for Europeanization of economic policies. 
Europeanization in monetary policy is “top-down”, because the management of price stability 
and monetary policy instruments is under the influence of the EU. This means, that whatever 
decisions are made in monetary policy by the EU authorities, member states will be affected 
by them. However, sometimes we see that Europeanization in growth and employment 
policies is “bottom-up” as well. Where member states enjoy certain amount of influence when 
decisions need to be made at EU-level. But Graziano claims that generally it is mainly the 
bigger member states which are more competitive. On the other hand we see that when 
member states are given the power to influences certain EU’s policies, the applications of 
those policies are not stable enough. Then we can have several difficulties to bring the desired 
results because clashes of different interests are apparent (Graziano & Vink, 2007, p 285). 
 
 
It has to be said that due to relative novelty of European integration the development of 
Europeanization in economic policies has been hindered to some extend by lack of effective 
coordinating tools. The presence of overlapping processes in policy management created 
chaos and inability to achieve the requirements of the EU-wide policy. On the one hand there 
was the EU goal for stability in monetary policy. On the other hand, there were different 
emerging processes coming from some member states in different economic policies. So 
basically, the creation of “the Luxembourg process in employment policy, the Cardiff process 
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in structural reforms, the Cologne process for the macroeconomic dialogue, and the 
overarching Lisbon process that focused on creating a world-class European knowledge-
based economy” alongside with the existence of the European monetary union caused few 
complications. These were loss of focus and a need for better organization for stimulating 
deeper Europeanization of economic policies (Graziano & Vink, 2007:286). 
 
 
Additionally, Europeanization has direct and indirect effects upon the domestic reaction of 
economic policy. Direct effects embody domestic adjustments in policy objectives like the 
involvement of national “stability culture”. Moreover, direct effects are seen in policy 
instruments like the removal of “national-exchange rates and interest-rest policies” (Graziano 
& Vink, 2007, p 288). Therefore, the direct effect of EMU caused member states to demolish 
their traditional monetary policy instruments in order to contribute to the common goals of price 
stability. 
 
 
The indirect effects of Europeanization on member states can be seen in the shifted behavior 
of companies as a result of the European single market and EMU. In order to achieve the 
objectives of the European single market and EMU, domestic firms had to change their 
business strategies towards more European-alike mechanism. Furthermore, member states 
had to follow their national responsibilities in the name of the common economic benefits of 
the union. Here Europeanization had a great influence upon the reactions of firms and the 
results were strict and focused rather on domestic economic activities in favor of the European 
single market and EMU’s goals (Graziano & Vink, 2007, p 288-289). 
 
 
Eventually, we see that the Europeanization of economy was achieved mainly through treaties 
and and economic systems that the member states joined. These actions were initiated from 
the European Union and led to changes not only in domestic legislative system, but even 
influenced the companies established in member states and business strategies imposed by 
them. Finally, we discover that even though the process of integration was not smooth at all 
times, the vision of better profits and other benefits motivated member states to leave certain 
power to the EU. In the following section we will introduce Germany as this member state will 
be our main focus for analysis.  
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Germany and the CFSP 
 
Finally, we have Germany who is going to be our main research area later on. We will focus 
on German contribution in relation to the development of the CFSP and European security. 
We are enclosing this part not only to demonstrate the German role within security issues, but 
to emphasize how it has evolved in time. Taking Howorth’s opinion into consideration, 
European security is significantly connected with German history. Therefore, we chose to 
focus on this country in our project as we assume that the importance of Germany as an actor 
in CFSP should not be neglected. 
 
To begin with, German position within the European Community has evolved vastly since the 
1950´s. First of all we have to recall that the integration itself had a lot to do with German 
history and European experience with it, as the new course in European cooperation began 
after the Second World War. In this relation, it should be emphasized that the very first treaty 
that can be considered as an European Integration agreement was signed between France 
and the UK in 1947 in Dunkirk and it referred to cooperation in the case of German aggression 
(Howorth, 2007, p.4).  Furthermore, the end of WWII left Germany destroyed, occupied, 
dependent, divided and even demilitarized. Disarmament remarked the German attitude until 
the 1990´s in minimal.  
Referring to the development of German influence on European security it should be 
mentioned that Germany was one of the founding fathers of the European Community in 1951 
when the Treaty of Paris came into power. 
Besides the indisputable economic motive the security also played role as the European 
authorities planned to establish peace throughout economic interdependence which would 
made war nearly impossible (Bull, 1982, p 149-151). In relation to security itself Germany fully 
supported the European Defense Policy in 1952-1954 which was eventually rejected by 
France in 1954. These negotiations were mostly about German rearmament which was still a 
taboo. Reversal came in 1955 when Germany joined NATO, after previously joining the WEU, 
and it regained certain autonomy in military. In the light of ongoing Cold War Germany 
supported American influence and involvement in European security, but it advocated for 
independent Security Policy, indeed (Brincker, 2004, p.40-41). 
 
With disintegration of the USSR, the end of the Cold War and reunion of Germany the US 
needed a new balance. In the 1990´s Germany came up with an argument that the interests of 
the US, represented throughout NATO, and the EC were not the same as it had been and 
therefore Europe apparently were in need of its own military structures. This was backed by an 
Italian-German declaration of 1990 (Dirk, 2010, p. 9). 
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Traditionally this idea was not supported in the UK which had a “Special Relation” with the US 
(Sussex and Shearman, 2004,p. 61). France was on the other hand a reliable partner for 
negotiations as the Franco-German troops were existing already. There was even a proposal 
to use these forces as the core for the CFSP, and the partnership remained incredibly strong.  
After the introduction of CFSP in 1993 Germany advocated for separate European security 
even more by proposing the “European structure” within the NATO. On the other hand it saw 
the EU itself was not capable and prepared to operate separately and it considered the WEU 
as a military arm (Dirk, 2010, p. 105). 
German attitude succeeded when the WEU became a mediator between the EU and NATO 
(Brincker, 2004, 64). Moreover, it could be seen that Germany tried to import national interests 
into the CFSP in 1990´s as most of its military structures were part of the WEU (Gross, 2009, 
p. 158). Besides arguing about differing interests Germany backed a proposal on majority 
voting instead of unanimity in military decision-making. In the 1990´s Germany favored 
Europeanization and Federalist approach in the matter of CFSP (Brincker, 2004,p. 59-64). 
After the St. Malo conference in 1998 between the GB and France the ESDP emerged in 1999 
(Howorth, 2007, p. 4). Germany did not have many options other than to accept the new 
conditions, otherwise it would remain excluded. New policy brought self-confidence to the EU 
and it started its own missions. At this time Germany saw an institutional conflict between 
NATO and the EU structures, but the German attitude to introduce independent European 
Security remained (Gross, 2009,p. 132). 
 
A significant turnover came after 11/9. The whole world saw a new threat and Europe had to 
adopt new CFSP and EDSP strategies and it moved forward in deeper integration of its foreign 
policies. Germany participated in ongoing operations and wars such as the war in Afghanistan 
or Iraq. Germany saw an opportunity to gain room for the EU to define its identity within the 
world and to eliminate the US dominance (Sussex & Shearman, 2004,p. 60). The beginning of 
the 21st century and its events brought Europe closer to coordination of foreign and security 
policies. The result was introduced throughout the European Security Strategy in 2003 which 
bounded the EU with deeper and much more coherent cooperation in the matter of CFSP and 
EDSP what was welcomed by German representation. Germany then provided its troops and 
led European missions in several cases (Gross, 2009, p. 137-145). 
 
 
To conclude, it can be said that the first half of the 20th century significantly influenced the 
German role in world and European security. However, during the last sixty years Germany 
favored and backed European independence in the question of foreign affairs and policies 
what on the other hand does not mean that it challenged the US. Germany also fully supported 
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integration of foreign policies since it saw the necessity of coherent cooperation within the 
Member States. This could be explained as an effort to regain German military confidence 
(Gross, 2009, p.5). In the analysis we will investigate and analyze based on selected 
documents and events, as to whether Germany has contributed in Europeanizing the EU 
Foreign Policy and how they may have done so.  
 
CFSP and Europeanization process of foreign policy 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is the official foreign policy of the European 
Union (Cini & Borragan, 2013, p.242). The emergence of this policy began shortly after the 
Second World War. The European security was developed under the security umbrella of the 
US (Cameron, 2007, p. 1). An unique approach in foreign policy was seen back then as a 
reason for the states to secure international security, which encouraged the countries to 
engage in international cooperation (Ibid.) This enabled member states of the European 
Community to combine their resources (Cini & Borragan, 2013, p.242). In return the countries 
gained an improved and more efficient usage of capabilities. The aim of this effort was not to 
replace or to be in competition with the US nor NATO. Several European countries regard the 
NATO as responsible for European territorial defense and peacekeeping. However, the Union 
has been responsible for implementing missions, such as treaties policing. That is the 
‘’separable but not separate’’ theory between the two organisms (NATO Review, 2010). 
The ancestor of the CFSP was created in 1970 by the formation of the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC). The EPC was an informal consultation process between member states 
on foreign policy matters, with the focus on creating a common approach towards foreign 
policy issues (Cini, & Borragan, 2013, pp.242-244). 
This was consolidated in the Maastricht Treaty (1992), which entered into force in 1993 and 
established the European Union (Ibid). By stating that the EPC was one pillar of the CFSP 
then intergovernmentalism, in the meaning of unanimity, was obviously the other one. The 
Amsterdam Treaty created the office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (held by Javier Solana until 1st December 2009, recently Lady Ashton 
(Consilium.europa.eu, 2013) to coordinate and represent the EU's foreign policy (Ibid). The 
CFSP became one of the three pillars of the EU as it is described in the Amsterdam treaty. 
The Treaty of Lisbon came to effect in December 2009 and brought an end to the pillar 
system. Moreover, it created a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. Since December 2011 the High Representative (HR) is in charge of the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), which was also created by the Treaty of Lisbon. It 
essentially is intended to be a common Foreign Office or Diplomatic Corps for the European 
Union (Cini, & Borragan, 2013, pp. 248-250). If we want to compare to the EPC, the goals are 
the same, cooperation and consultation between the members states are at the basis at the 
project. However, the definition becomes deeper: The CSDP has to ensure the security for the 
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EU and member states. To make it concrete, there exists a systematic consultation within the 
Council which has to be done. Moreover, the Council can define a common position which is 
binding for the member states (Cini, & Borragan, 2013, pp.244-245).  
 
Furthermore, there are several common actions that can occur: the Council has to agree 
unanimously whether the EU should take any action. All the member states are bound to 
respect this common action (Ibid). Furthermore it is interesting to study to what extent CFSP 
has an impact on national foreign policies, a concept of Europeanization or so called 
Brusselization of the national policies. 
Along with the creation and the growth of the EU, the EPC and then the CFSP highlight the 
fact that the countries tend to share policies more frequently than in the past. According to the 
EU governance specialist Radaelli, Europeanization can be seen as a ‘’process involving 
construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined 
and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
(national and transnational) discourse, political structures and public choices’’ (Radaelli, 2003). 
The Council adopts decisions which define the approach of the Union to a specific subject 
area. According to the article 29 from the Treaty of European Union (TEU), member states 
must be sure that their national policies are conformed to the Union’s positions. Moreover, 
member states have to show mutual solidarity according to Article 32 TEU. Finally Article 34 
TEU explains that when some members are present in a global international meeting they 
represent all the members of the EU. Through all these law dispositions we can feel the 
influence of the EU on the national policies and structures. 
The past years have shown a growing interest and care in matching the Europeanization 
concept with the foreign policy field (Alecu de Flers & Müller, 2010, p.1). The Europeanization 
concept is now applied to the EU foreign policy concept. 
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METHODOLOGY 
In this section we will include our methodological choices in the project. Our methodological 
choices will be explained by the research design, followed by research approach, type of data, 
reliability and validity. The explanation of text analysis and finally a section of limitations will be 
found at the end of this section. 
 
Research design 
The research design of this project is a case study. We have chosen this type of design 
because we focus on a single political subject - Germany. According to Bryman (2012, p 66), 
the purpose of a case study is to examine existing details about a given case (Bryman, 2013, 
p 68), thus we are able to get familiar with the facts about our area of interest, which is 
Germany. Therefore, by choosing to investigate Germany, we aim to discover whether and 
how the country has tried to influence Europeanization of CFSP. Since a case study implies 
that the quality of information is important, not the quantity, our focus will be to determine clear 
signs of German intentions to foster and deepen mutual cooperation in the sector of CFSP. 
Therefore, we intent to focus on German official proposals for further development of CFSP by 
means of a Joint letter from German and French Presidents to the Council published in 1996 
and a Franco-German Declaration from 2012. Furthermore, we will pay attention to German 
contribution to the Berlin Plus Arrangements between the EU and NATO. This agreement 
serves the purpose of demonstrating the significant influence Germany had on increasing EU 
responsibility on world affairs. We will exemplify this by assessing the German involvement in 
resolving the Macedonian conflict of 2001.  In this regard, our target is to reflect German 
initiative to establish European common security during the 1990´s and 2000’s. More 
specifically we will analyze the Macedonian case to illustrate German initiative in CFSP in 
practice with previous examination of the importance of Berlin Plus Arrangement with relation 
to Germany. Finally, with the second document, the Declaration, we want to stress that 
Germany has not given up on its plans to push CFSP forward. By doing so, we aim to gain the 
needed knowledge to understand the German ideas and attitude toward Europeanization of 
CFSP.  
 
The project overview is composed of an introduction, methodology, theory, analysis and 
conclusion. The introduction part explains the research area of the project and introduces the 
problem formulation that needs to be answered in the conclusion. The methodology part 
reveals our own way of making this research in order to get the maximum results possible for 
answering our problem formulation. The theory section covers information about the nature of 
Europeanization and its dimensions. Moreover, in the theory part, we will reveal the different 
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roles of the European Institutions and the member states in the decision-making processes 
and how those roles complement and confirm certain concepts of Europeanization presented 
by different authors. Most importantly the theory will provide us with the tools needed to 
conduct the analysis and thereby answer our problem formulation. Therefore, a connection 
between Europeanization perspectives and the EU policy-making approaches needs to be 
made in order to see how accurate Europeanization ideas are presented by different writers 
and whether those ideas are really relevant to the EU law-making mechanisms. The analysis 
part will discuss a case of Germany with relation to its role in constructing and Europeanizing 
CFSP. The conclusion section will summarize our findings and answer our problem 
formulation.  
 
Research approach 
This part of our project will account for the way we make the analysis and therefore answer 
our problem formulation. To begin with, the first part of the analysis frame will consist of brief 
background information, where we will briefly introduce the nature of CFSP establishment. In 
that context, we want to get familiar with the specific character of CFSP. Therefore, we aim to 
trace possible Europeanization signs by referring to the theoretical part of this project. 
To fulfill the purpose of this background we are going to highlight few examples with clear 
Europeanization symptoms in the CFSP with regard to the theory. Secondly, we will go 
through the mentioned Joint letter from 1996 to emphasize the Europeanization proposals 
towards CFSP. Then we will move to the investigation of German role in establishing the 
Berlin Plus Arrangement. This part will be followed by the German involvement in resolving the 
Macedonian conflict of 2001. The very next part will be dedicated to the Franco-German 
Declaration from 2012 and its illustration of German recent initiatives. Finally, we will provide a 
conclusion of our outputs that will answer our question. 
 
 
Initially we will focus on the development of European security from the end of the Second 
World War with certain attention paid towards the purposes behind this policy. We find this 
chapter important in order to improve our understanding of the nature of CFSP, which will help 
us explain German participation and attitude toward the CFSP. We will try to support this 
chapter by referring to the relevant historical events presented in the section of context, in 
order to understand Germany as an actor in the sector of EU Foreign policy.  
Next step will be to look at the Franco-German joint letter in order to identify German 
intentions to strengthen CFSP. First, we will explain briefly the importance of the letter 
including its origin. Moreover we will go through the suggestions that we find to identify 
Europeanization in CFSP. At the same time we will refer to our theoretical part to support our 
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findings. We will finish this section with a brief conclusion on our investigation and applicability 
of the theory. 
In regards to the Berlin Plus Arrangement we will examine speeches of the politicians, 
interviews with authorities and relevant pieces of EU legislation in order to discover, how 
Germany fostered the process of CFSP spin. The interviews we intend to use have been 
made prior to our project. We did not interview the respondents but analyzed already existing 
records.  Our main task here is to prove that Germany advocated for the agreement to 
contribute to the independence of the CFSP and European security in general. The conclusion 
will summarize whether the theory served appropriately for expressing the signs of German 
Europeanization initiative.  
In our following section we focus on the German involvement in Macedonian, in which we want 
to stress the role of Germany and its participation in resolving the Macedonian conflict. Our 
main target is to emphasize how Germany by participated in solving the conflict and thereby 
continued to the institutional CFSP further forward. Here we will analyze based mainly on 
secondary sources including literature, which will give us a coherent knowledge of the events. 
We will examine and apply the theoretical concepts presented in the section of theory. In 
conclusion we will highlight our findings and conclude on the efficiency of the theory used. 
Last part of the analysis is dedicated to the Franco-German Declaration. We chose this one as 
it as a very recent document which illustrates the ongoing German attempts to strengthen the 
CFSP. A brief description of the origin of the document will be presented followed by using the 
proposals. Additionally we will apply the theoretical concepts in order to answer our problem 
formulation. We will continue with proving the German attempts to apply Europeanization on 
CFSP. Lastly we will highlight the main arguments made in the analysis, in order for us to 
produce a thorough conclusion based on the key analytical findings. 
 
 
Type of data 
For this project, we are going to use a qualitative data because we want to focus on the 
meaning of the words rather than on the quantity. We do not want to gather statistics and 
present numbers or graphics, as the quantitative data analysis implies. However we rather, 
find that the explanatory factor of certain date is more relevant for our project because it will 
help us understand Europeanization modifications in relation to the CFSP (Bryman, 2012, p 
388). 
 
Furthermore, the sources for the analysis part will be primary and secondary sources, such as 
interviews, documents, speeches, eu legislation and books. As stated above, we are not going 
to conduct the interviews ourselves but we are rather going to use interviews conducted by 
others. Moreover, those interviews contain information provided by German representatives 
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toward journalists, whom we are not familiar with. The interview was found in an official French 
newspaper. The aim of the use of interviews is to identify how Germany perceived CFSP 
development and what actions the country committed in relation to CFSP. We hereby want to 
demonstrate the German attempts to Europeanize CFSP. In addition, we will use online 
documents, such as Franco-German declaration and Franco-German joint letter. These two 
online sources contain information written directly by official German and French 
representatives, who are considered to have certain influence in the decision-making 
processes of CFSP. In that specific context, we find it important to emphasize that our focus is 
only on German intention to Europeanize CFSP. Although the two documents are produced by 
both Germany and France, the French participation is not relevant to our analysis. 
Furthermore, the speeches of our choice are conducted by German officials toward the public 
media. Those speeches reveal German attitude toward the further development of CFSP. 
Moreover, as mentioned above, we wouldn’t be able to identify Europeanization signs without 
the help of our theoretical part, where the definition and the two different dimensions of 
Europeanization will be examined. We will interpret the bottom-up and top-down 
Europeanization by looking at different theoretical opinions and relate them to the practical 
roles of the EU institutions and member states in the CFSP development. Therefore, we can 
see whether the nature of the decision-making processes of the EU and the member states in 
the CFSP is related somehow to the top-down and bottom-up Europeanization mechanisms 
identified by different authors. 
As, we mentioned above, we are going to use primary and secondary data to conduct the 
analytical part of our project. Due to our choice of analyzing the joint letter and the declaration, 
we will conduct a document analysis. According to Bryman, this type of analysis is appropriate 
for examining certain changes in the history. Moreover, using documents as a source of data 
is considered to be a low cost. Another advantage of analyzing documents is that they reveal 
information about how the research object of our choice - Germany - perceived the 
surrounding environment. Furthermore the chosen documents provide details and good quality 
information. Since we are using internet documents, it is worth mentioning that they are easily 
accessible in regard to paper-based documents. However, there are certain disadvantages 
when trying to analyze documents. For example, when interviews are conducted, the 
journalists may have distorted the provided information based on the purpose of the interview. 
Another disadvantage is to find what we need and thus it can be time consuming (Bryman, 
2012, p 554).  
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Choice of data 
The data choice was motivated by empirical and qualitative information. We selected this data 
by means of official documents. We acknowledge the fact that the Franco-German Joint Letter 
and the Franco-German Declaration used in the following analysis part are issued by both 
France and Germany. However we believe that since Germany was a vital actor in fostering 
these initiatives, we find the choice of data to be relevant. It should be mentioned that we do 
not question the French influence, but we solely chose to focus on the German contribution. 
 Through these two data pieces, we are still able to reach the main dynamics of bottom-up 
Europeanization. Moreover we do not wish to estimate on the level of balance between the 
two actors in developing the two documents. As previously mentioned we solely focus on the 
fact that Germany was a part of the developing of these initiatives. Some other data elements 
used in the project correspond to speeches, law pieces, and interviews. As far as the Védrine-
Fischer Joint interview is concerned, it has not been conducted by us, but is produced by the 
French association ‘’Le Monde des Débats’’. We still believe it to be a concrete and variant 
piece of data as the interview is conducted directly with the involved political leaders. 
Moreover, studying the literature of Europeanization we have made use of several data 
formulated in the original language of French, one of Germany’s main partners in the EU. That 
is why some of the quotations were translated in English before featuring in the project and 
being confronted to the theory for the analysis. It should be mentioned that a member of the 
group is a native French speaker and therefore we felt compelled to make use of this 
resource.   
We have been cautious with using such documents in a foreign language, despite the 
temptation to make use of relevant German literature. We neglected to do so, as none of the 
group members are native German speakers. By carefully selecting our data we have 
attempted to avoid imprecisions inherent to the translations. Therefore the vast majority of our 
literature was found in English. 
·          
Reliability and Validity in qualitative research 
According to Bryman (2012, p 46), the question of reliability emphasizes the idea of whether 
we are able to use certain information the way we think we can use it and whether this 
information is what it proclaims to be. Basically, the essence of reliability questions is whether 
we can trust the given information.  
In relation to this project, we find the data of our choice for the analysis to be reliable because 
its content covers documents prepared directly by German officials. For example, Franco-
German joint letter in 1996 and Franco-German declaration from 2012, are formulated directly 
by the German and French political leaders. Moreover we have included an interview where 
Germany demonstrates its own spontaneous attitude toward given questions about CFSP 
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development. We rely on this information because it is provided by Germany itself, which is as 
mentioned previously, the target of our analysis.  
The question of validity focuses on whether certain data is accepted and helpful enough in 
justifying a given point of view. Furthermore, it deals with how we can understand whether a 
piece of information is relevant in our case, so that we base our key analytical findings on valid 
data. We believe that the information used for the analysis is valid because it covers official 
acceptable sources, such as documents and books (Bryman 2012, p 47). 
 
Limitations 
This section will account for the limitations of the project. Initially, we have tried to be as 
objective as possible, however it was inevitable to avoid certain limitations. We have chosen 
four specific incidents which we believe stresses how Germany attempted to Europeanize the 
CFSP. We acknowledge that our examples are not the only examples of Germany attempting 
to Europeanize the CFSP. For instance, the Stability Plan based on the security of the Balkan 
region was partly instrumented by the former German Foreign Minister, Joshka Fischer.  
However we have chosen not to include this, and rather focus on our examples of choice.  
The diversity of acceptations of the Europeanization concept seems to be a limitation to the 
use of this concept. However, concentrating the subject comprehension on a few meanings 
tends to avoid such criticisms. It is a focusing choice at the expense of an exhaustive one.  
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ANALYSES 
 
This chapter is dedicated to our analysis, where we will apply the theory of our choice to the 
primary data we chose for our research. The analytical section will consist of four parts while 
each of them will be focused on different German activity. By focusing on four separate 
events, we wish to reflect the development. Therefore, our sections are in chronologic order. 
The first sub chapter will examine the Franco-German joint letter from 1996. We intend to 
reflect German proposals and relate them to the theory in order to prove the signs of 
Europeanization attempts. Furthermore, we will move to materials from ´Berlin Plus 
‘negotiations. The investigation of found interview and speech will help us answer the research 
question. The next issue in terms of Europeanization of CFSP is German participation in EU 
involvement in Macedonian conflict in 2003. Eventually, we will analyse the influence of 
Franco-German Declaration from 2012. Using this declaration we wish to illustrate the 
development of German contribution to CFSP. Focusing on these documents our intention is 
to demonstrate German attempts to Europeanization of CFSP. 
 
 
Franco-German Joint Letter 
In December 1996, Germany Chancellor and the French president prepared a joint letter with 
some proposals concerning the CFSP development, addressed to the European Council. Both 
countries, Germany and France believed that the CFSP needed further developments and the 
IGC negotiations were seen as an appropriate terrain for proposing possible improvements. 
The proposals in the joint letter reflected the German and French point of view in regards to 
improving the CFSP. They identified the fact that Europe was unable to act unanimously within 
the CFSP decision-making processes, as a problem. Moreover, the member states wanted to 
see a more useful, coherent, solid and open CFSP that would strengthen the successfulness 
to achieve the goals embedded in the policy. Therefore, the following proposals envelop ideas 
to strengthen the ability of making more European commonly accepted and beneficial 
decisions in CFSP (Chirac & Kohl, 1996). 
The joint letter itself clearly demonstrates the German intention to Europeanize the CFSP, 
because this letter reveals the willingness of the country to sacrifice certain national 
sovereignty in order to help the EU achieve more commonly accepted CFSP developments. 
According to our theory, Germany’s joint letter with its proposals indicates a sign of bottom-up 
Europeanization, as the decision-making process at EU-level is influenced by the interests of 
Member States (de Flers &Müller, 2010). On the contrary, we could argue the opposite point, 
because the German proposals were addressed to one of the EU institutions responsible for 
the realizations of CFSP amendments – the Council. Therefore, Germany clearly needed the 
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approval of the Council, which implies that the actual power lies with the EU, as it is the 
Council who decides which decision to prioritize and which to reject. We describe this 
decision-making interaction in our theory under the section about the institutional involvement 
within the EU. In regard to this, our theory argues that when the EU is able to exercise 
influence upon member states or third countries it is the top-down Europeanization, which is 
apparent. In this specific matter, the EU has the ability to influence both member states and 
possibly affect third countries. Having said that, it is obvious that Germany has tried to 
Europeanize CFSP by proposing certain improvements for the common benefit of the policy, 
however both dimensions of Europeanization can be argued. We recognize bottom-up 
Europeanization through the German intention to bring its ideas to the EU and the top-down 
Europeanization through the Council’s ability to enforce and reject these certain decisions. As 
both dimensions of Europeanization can be argued, we believe that is an example of 
integrative perspective, which combines both bottom-up and top-down Europeanization, or as 
Cini recognizes it as cross-loading dimension of Europeanization. We argue in favor of this 
approach to be applied in this matter, as it is one hand the Council who takes the final 
decisions and thereby download a decision, and on the other the member state who upload a 
decision shaping EU politics.  
Eventually, we see a difference between taking decisions and exercising them as it requires 
different forms of Europeanization. We also see a problem in the theory because it is 
Germany, a member state, who proposes to the Council, which is an EU institution and by that 
Germany exercises bottom-up. However since the Council is an institution representing the 
states, it may be argued that the dimension of bottom-up Europeanization is exercised by the 
Council.  On the other hand, when a decision is taken and being empowered, the Council must 
have the approval of several other member states and therefore it functions as an EU 
institution exercising top-down Europeanization.   
 
 
In the proposals Germany suggested that it should establish a permanent joint working unit, 
which would be part of the Council Secretariat. This suggested joint working unit would be 
composed of people from the member states, the Commission and the Secretariat. The 
function of this working unit would be to help the Council in developing more commonly 
accepted decisions and to manage their implementation afterwards. The initiative for 
establishing a unit that would represent the collaboration between both member states and the 
EU institutions in CFSP development, implies that Germany believed that the CFSP should not 
only be a responsibility of nationals, but rather function as venue where different domestic 
ideas combines with the ideas of the EU. This is supported by Cini and Borragan (2010) who 
believe that Europeanization is apparent when nationals are willing to contribute to commonly 
recognize European interests. As mentioned in the section of context, the Council is an EU 
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institution consisting of national leaders who represents national governmental interests. This 
means that the nationals incorporate their domestic ideas to the CFSP and therefore 
Europeanization signs are vividly seen terms of the bottom-up dimension (Cini & Borragan, 
2010). Additionally, we recognize the common initiatives taken by the member states as being 
compatible with one of the Europeanization interpretations of Olsen. We are referring to the 
one which is called ‘Developing institutions at the EU level’. We are convinced that the 
German proposal to establish ‘a joint working unit’ demonstrates the country’s willingness for 
improving CFSP. Furthermore, the other Europeanization interpretation of our choice, which is 
called ‘Central penetration of national systems of governance argues that the national 
willingness toward common policy is triggered by national dissatisfaction with EU law. 
 Moreover, according to Olsen (2007), member states have different interests in CFSP and 
they are not willing to compromise those interests for a common action unless there is a bitter 
experience to make nationals have more solidarity ideas for improvements. Therefore, with the 
first proposal we can argue that Germany was not content with the results of the CFSP. As a 
result of this, Germany felt compelled to shape the EU institutions by suggesting the 
Commission’s involvement in the joint working unit which would serve to ease the tension 
between different interests and contribute to a more common CFSP decision making process. 
In the section of context we have witnessed how the Commission has played a role in 
Europeanizing economic policy by achieving consensus on common policy in the EU sector of 
Economy. 
Another aspect of the German proposal was that the EU should be given further responsibility 
in regards to the CFSP decision-making procedures. The EU would hereby play a significant 
role in the achievement of more unanimous and effective CFSP decisions. 
With regard to this, there were three specific aspects that Germany felt compelled to 
emphasize. Firstly, Germany suggested that it should be the duty of the Council to put 
decisions in order and direct their implementation. This implies that member states should not 
only respect the decisions made in the Council, but the member states should also be willing 
to compromise their domestic interests for the shared benefits of CFSP development. 
Secondly, a qualified majority voting was seen by Germany as a necessary step toward 
making the CFSP decision-making process more negotiable and easier between the Council’s 
representatives. Thirdly, in decisions where unanimity is required, the German’s suggested it 
would be better if member states abstained from voting instead of veto voting and hereby 
hamper joint European CFSP initiatives. Germany was convinced, that the suggested 
amendments in those three characteristics would lead to efficient management and 
implementation of the CFSP. In the theory section, Olsen (2007) argues that Europeanization 
processes involved the member states’ readiness to be more involved in the EU decision-
making process, so member states can make sure that they will avoid certain policy misfits.  
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This could suggest that Germany, through the joint letter proposals, wanted to make sure that 
the EU CFSP ideas would complement the national ones and thus Germany did not want to 
create any misfit conflicts with CFSP. Cases of policy misfit between domestic and EU-level 
ideas, makes it harder for the union to reach a common decision.  
 
According to Olsen, if there is misfit between national and EU policies, it would be problematic 
for nationals to implement EU decisions. Therefore, the EU will try to soften possible policy 
misfits by helping nationals through mediating factors. With this in mind, Germany’s 
willingness to facilitate the EU’s activities signifies the desire of the country toward a more 
Europeanized CFSP. 
Furthermore, according to data presented in the official European website (Europa.eu, 2012), 
decisions in the CFSP usually are made through unanimity, which is an obvious indicator for 
complicating the decision process as unanimity is rather hard to achieve when different 
interests are involved. In order to solve this issue Germany proposed qualified majority voting 
rather than unanimity. This voices the German intention to ease the decision-making process 
and thus further Europeanize CFSP.  
Additionally, Germany proposed that in cases of unanimity, veto voting should be held back. 
This demonstrates the German desire to facilitate the decision-making procedures by easing 
the possibility of implementing further common policy. We believe that this is an example of 
attempting to establish and adapt further common policy, and therefore we regard this as an 
example of Europeanization the CFSP development.   
Moreover, Germany stressed the importance of having a specific positional character which 
would represent and embody the EU Foreign Policy.  Germany did not suggest the 
establishment of a new institution but rather requested a more recognizable and unified image 
of CFSP which would complement the Council’s work. Germany identified the need for a 
personalized CFSP image that would be easily recognized by other global actor as the 
spokesperson of EU.  
This signifies the country’s motivation for creating a more commonly accepted and identifiable 
CFSP which in turn emphasizes further Europeanization of the policy. Moreover, Olsen (2007) 
states that, it is the member states themselves who represent the face of CFSP.  The external 
confusion of who exactly represents the CFSP is a result of the differing national ideas that 
exist within the EU (Cini and Borragan, 2010). It is worth mentioning that such a figure has 
now been identified with the appointment of Lady Ashton as the EU Foreign Policy Chief (The 
Guardian, 25th of November). On the basis of the section mentioned above, we can conclude 
 that Germany were partly instrumental in addressing the issue of a lacking central EU foreign 
figure and that their suggestion assisted in pushing further for the establishment of the present 
EU Foreign Policy Chief position. This figure was installed to create and represent the 
common foreign policy of EU. Regarding theory by Cini and Borragan, national ambitions of 
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mutual recognition is an Europeanization sign. We therefore understand that mutual 
recognition can be seen through one existing CFSP image to represent national solidarity. 
With that in mind, the German vision for CFSP to have a single voice demonstrates 
Europeanization of CFSP. 
In conclusion, taking into account Franco-German joint letter along with the theory, we clearly 
identify German attempts to strengthen and develop CFSP. Moreover, the German proposals 
themselves implicate different aspects of Europeanizing CFSP. The attempts to further 
develop the CFSP via the expressed demand for a representative image of the CFSP, testifies 
to the fact that Germany pushed for more common foreign policy. Furthermore we regard the 
German demand for changing the voting systems as a sign of Europeanization, as the 
demolishment of veto voting would ease the implementation of common policies.     
Therefore, we find the mentioned German suggestions to be in accordance with the theory, 
which explains the nature of Europeanization. in this regard, we can come to a conclusion that 
Germany has actually tried to Europeanize CFSP. Moreover, on the basis of the theory, we 
believe that Germany, through its attempts to Europeanize CFSP, wanted to contribute to 
further European integration in the sector of foreign policy. This means that the country, by 
virtue of its abilities, has tried to bring its own ideas to the EU law and thus influence certain 
EU policies. 
 
Finally, it is worth specifying that there are two Europeanization dimensions of CFSP that we 
recognize in the German case. Firstly, we identify bottom-up Europeanization by means of the 
German attempts to submit its perceptions to the EU. And secondly, we distinguish top-down 
Europeanization through Council’s competence to enforce and reject decisions. Therefore as 
Olsen (2007) points out, explaining and understanding the nature of Europeanization can be a 
complicated task, however we have attempted to do so despite flexible definitions of the 
theoretical concepts. We have nevertheless identified how the two Europeanization 
dimensions can be applied via the Joint Letter. 
 
The ‘’Berlin Plus’’ agreements 
We have chosen to include the Berlin Plus arrangements as we believe they provide us with 
an indication of how Germany has contributed in Europeanizing the CFSP. The Berlin Plus 
agreements, permitted the European Union to make use of tools provided by NATO if they 
appear as necessary to the full achievement of the missions decided by the European Council. 
In exchange, NATO assists the European Union on the strategic management of these 
missions. These Berlin Plus agreements were adopted during the Washington Summit in 
1999. Finally, a common declaration was established on the 12th and 13th of December 2002 in 
Copenhagen after enduring difficulties with the compliance of Greece, Turkey, Malta and 
Cyprus (Copenhagen European Council 12th and 13th December, Presidency Conclusions). The 
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CFSP is being attached with NATO as far as logistic and strategic means are concerned, to 
permit a better and more efficient implementation. From an external point of view this decision 
could appear as surprising. 
At the time of the establishment of CFSP, the French initiative was predominant, and the aim 
was notably to get rid of the United States influence and interference in the European foreign 
policy. It can appear as quite surprising that the European Union wants to deal with NATO on 
foreign affairs and missions less than ten years after having created the possibility to have an 
independent and common security policy. That means two main things: first, if the European 
Union feels the need of NATO assistance, it implies that the EU does not regard its own tools 
and means to be sufficient in implementing its common foreign policies. More so, it is also 
evidence to the fact that transatlantic vision still thrived at the time and regained force in the 
1990’s. Two of the three main countries that drive the CFSP are UK and Germany.  
The UK is traditionally pro-Atlantic whereas Germany applies so called ‘‘reflexive 
multilateralism’’ (Katzenstein, 1997). Reflexive multilateralism means that Germany tries to 
gain importance and voice as far as foreign affairs are concerned. We believe that to be a 
reason of why the German government was promoting the Berlin Plus agreements. Moreover 
Germany was at the head of the European Union presidency during the first semester of 1999. 
At the Washington Summit in 1999 Germany were conducting the objectives and policies of 
the European Union, as the countries decided to start implementing the Berlin plus 
agreements on the basis of the ideas developed in Berlin in 1996. This NATO summit 
concludes that ‘’the North Atlantic Alliance, founded on the principles of democracy, individual 
liberty and the rule of law, remains the basis of our collective defense; it embodies the 
transatlantic link that binds North America and Europe in a unique defense and security 
partnership’’ (Washington Summit Communique issued by the Heads of State and 
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 
24th April 1999).  Before the Lisbon Treaty the member state hosting the presidency of the 
European Union, were responsible of both European Council and the Council of the Council of 
the European Union.as mentioned Germany hosted the presidency during 1999, and therefore 
were responsible of mentioned institutions.  
We have decided to asses some of the speeches made by Joschka Fischer, the former 
German foreign affairs minister, as they highlight the role of Germany through the presidency 
of the European Union and its will to end the South-East European crisis by re-installing 
stability. He highlights the fact that the CFSP means are not sufficient and that the logistical 
and strategically means of NATO are necessary and have to be considered as an asset. 
 
In a speech held in the beginning of the German presidency at the head of the European 
Union, he depicts the necessity of stability in this area: ‘’In Germany, we have not forgotten the 
invaluable contribution of the people of Central and Eastern Europe in ending the division of 
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Germany and Europe. To allow a zone of instability to emerge beyond the current EU border 
would be, given our experience in the Balkans, irresponsible politically. In addition, it would be 
a breach of promise to the new democracies with fatal consequences for Europe’’ (Joschka 
Fischer, European Parliament in Strasbourg, 12 January 1999).  
He also settles objectives for European security and foreign affairs, with an assumed goal of 
improving the means and creating a real foreign affairs policy. He also settles the objectives 
for the common foreign security policy in front of the French National Assembly: ‘’ the 
implementation of a common foreign and security policy also requires a European security and 
defense identity. Europe faces a major challenge to develop, through multilateral and joint 
action with other partners, the international political order to make an order of peace based on 
international law. I say this also specifically thinking of the recent developments that go in the 
direction of strengthening of unilateralism in international politics. Collective defense will 
remain a task for NATO and SFOR as shown in Bosnia, NATO also plays an important role in 
crisis management. But the EU must also be able to practice their own military crisis 
management whenever the EU / WEU consider it necessary to act and partners in North 
America do not want not participate in the action. The extraction force deployed in Kosovo and 
Macedonia led by France is a first step in this direction. We should also develop a European 
autonomous capacity for action. During our dual presidency at the head of the EU and WEU, 
we will redouble our efforts to exploit this new dynamic in conjunction with France, Great 
Britain and other partners to advance the creation of a European defense identity and 
security’’ (Joschka Fischer, National Assembly, Paris, 20 January 1999). 
 
Moreover, the German ‘’reflexive multilateralism’’ that describes their support for the Berlin 
Plus agreements and why they acted is highlighted in a comparative interview made by the 
periodical ‘’Le Monde des Débats’’. Both French and German Foreign Affairs Ministers Hubert 
Védrine and Joschka Fischer are being interviewed. ‘’Monde des Débats: In his last book, 
Helmut Schmidt begins a chapter savagely explaining this: “Germany must now redirects to 
France the whole favorable attitude she had towards the United States. Fischer: Helmut 
Schmidt may say that, but me, I must think about it. I think we should not make a comparison 
in terms of our relations with the United States; we do not want to integrate ourselves with the 
United States. Our relationship with France is characterized by a different kind of intimacy, I 
dare say’’ (Joint interview of Hubert Védrine and Joschka Fischer, 10 Mai 2001). Based on the 
above mentioned we conclude that Germany were of the key instrumental actors in developing 
the Berlin Plus arrangements. The Berlin Plus arrangements enabled the EU to make use of 
NATO assets, and hereby empowered the capabilities of the EU Foreign policy.  We believe 
that the German involvement in the Berlin Plus arrangements are signs of German 
Europeanization of European foreign policy. The Europeanization will be explained in the 
following section. 
43 
 
 
‘’Berlin plus’’ and Europeanization 
The German presidency of the EU from January to June 1999 led Germany to lead a major 
German role and impact on the Berlin Plus agreements. Through these influences, Germany 
was able to spread its directions in terms of foreign policies. The Berlin Plus arrangements 
correspond to an uploading dimension, which means that the member states upload their 
preferences and thereby shape the EU policy. In this case, it is the projection of the German 
foreign security preferences. The process is made through the mechanism of socialization, 
because Germany tries to influence the EU-level decision-making by projecting its own 
decisions. As it is described in this case, this socialization is made by Germany in order to 
achieve its goals. This socialization is focused on the promotion of its own interests. We have 
already seen that it can be particularly attractive for member states because they are then able 
to project their own national preferences. In our case it is German foreign policy which is the 
object. This may seem more attractive for Germany as implementation by own means, is 
insufficient. Through these examples, we have been able to emphasize the influence of 
Germany in foreign and security policies on the foreign and security policies of the European 
Union, through the process of socialization. Conclusively we find that Germany attempted to 
Europeanize EU foreign policy by mean of the bottom-up approach, by uploading their 
preferences to EU level and trying to shape EU policy.  It appears in a domain where Germany 
has still some lacks inherited by the twentieth Century and its history. It contributes to a larger 
German diplomatic perspective to rebuild a worldwide diplomacy and to escape from turning 
into an island, with the EU as only interlocutor. In this case, the German presidency of the EU 
is a key point, as it places Germany in a particular and interesting position. On an 
intergovernmentalist analysis, its position undeniably permits Germany to act strongly and 
deeply to shape the EU policies during the mandate. In this case, Germany shapes the EU 
CFSP by uploading their preferences to EU level. This kind of power is very important for 
Europeanization, as it determines the opportunities that the member states have to upload 
their national preferences to the EU level.  
 
Macedonia conflict 2001 
Macedonia is a former Republic of Macedonia of Yugoslavia which declared independence in 
1991, after holding a referendum on the issue (Julie Kim, 2001, p.1). As with many of the 
countries, Macedonia is a diversely populated nation with different ethnicities. The biggest 
minority in Macedonia is the ethnic group of Albanians. According to Macedonian authorities 
the ethnic Albanians makes up 22% of the general population, however ethnic Albanians are 
convinced that their total number of residents makes up 40% of the general population (Julie 
Kim, 2001, p.5). Relations between the Slavic Macedonian majority and Albanian minority 
have been tense since the country declared independence, however ethnic Albanian political 
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parties have been included in the political process by winning seats in the Macedonian 
parliament (Julie Kim, 2001, p.3). Despite having elected Albanian representatives 
participating in the political process, Macedonia was at the time perceived by many, as a 
somewhat segregated country. The ethnic Albanians in Macedonia demanded increased rights 
both culturally and educationally (Julie Kim, 2001, p.3).  
Specifically the ethnic Albanians demanded recognition of Albanian as an official language 
and state support for the Albanian-language University in Tetovo. Moreover the ethnic 
Albanians pushed for a change of the Macedonian constitution, which in their opinion 
relegated ethnic Albanians to second-class citizens. On the other hand, many Macedonians 
were convinced that that the Albanian minority enjoyed sufficient rights and questioned their 
quest for further autonomy, which many feared would lead into unification with Kosovo or 
Albania (Julie Kim, 2001, p.5). The tensions between the ethnic Albanians and Slavic 
Macedonian majority resulted in open clashes during the 1990’s, however the attacks in 2001 
caught the attention of the international community. In 2001 a rebel group calling themselves 
National Liberation Army launched attacks on Macedonian security forces in western 
Macedonia, which is dominated by the Albanian minority. The NLA led attacks evolved across 
the country and reached a location placed only 30 kilometers from the capital city of Skopje 
(Julie Kim, 2001, p.5). The National Liberation Army claimed its only objective was to improve 
the rights of the Albanian minority in Macedonia.  
Via channels of western media, the rebel group published their specific demands: International 
mediation to resolve their differences with the Slavic Majority, exact determination of the 
Albanian minority population number, release of political prisoners and several changes in the 
Macedonian constitution recognizing Albanians as a constituent people of Macedonia (Julie 
Kim, 2001, p.6). It is worth mentioning that neither of the two seated political parties claimed 
any official association with the National Liberation Army, and signed a declaration 
condemning the use of violence in achieving political objectives (Ibid). 
In the following months several different Albanian rebel groups emerged and launched attacks 
on the Macedonian security forces. The Macedonian authorities attempted to combat the rebel 
groups by mean of force, however several international actors managed to pressure the 
Macedonian government to open dialogue with elected Albanian representatives, yet refused 
to negotiate with the actual rebels (Julie Kim, 2001, p.1). 
On the 13th of August 2001, the elected Albanian representatives and the Macedonian 
government agreed upon a framework that ensured peace and promised to improve the rights 
of the Albanian minority. The agreement is known as the Ohrid agreement and included 
recognizing Albanian as an official Macedonian language (Ohrid agreement, 2001, p.2). 
In the following section we will present the EU involvement in the conflict along with 
emphasizing how Germany was involved in resolving the crisis.  
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This will assist us in answering whether, and if so how Germany has participated in the 
evolution of EU Foreign & Security Policy. 
 
European Union involvement in the Macedonia conflict 
Along with several other impactful international actors, the EU pushed for a political solution to 
the conflict. Despite supporting the Macedonian government in refusing to negotiate with 
certain rebel groups, the EU regarded political dialogue as key in resolving the issue. The 
then-high representative of Foreign Policy Javier Solana, made several official visits to Skopje, 
in which they offered their backing to the sovereignty of the Macedonian state. During an EU 
summit in Stockholm, the EU Foreign Ministers expressed their solidarity with the Macedonian 
government and offered assistance with border management and refugee flows (Julie Kim, 
2001, p.16). In the following months EU officials held several meetings with the Macedonian 
leaders and pressed these into forming a grand coalition with would be able to facilitate inter-
ethnic relations (Ibid). 
The EU pressured the Macedonian government to hold peace talks with elected Albanian 
representatives and also implement some of the Albanian demands improving their rights.   
 
The EU warned the Macedonian government of cutting off their economic assistance provided 
by the EU, if they did not achieve sustainable political settlement to the conflict. Moreover the 
EU made clear that any eventual EU membership would depend on the positive achievements 
from the political dialogue between the elected Albanian representatives and the Macedonian 
government (Ibid). As previously mentioned the Ohrid agreement was signed on the 13th of 
august, which ensured peace between the National Liberation Army and the Macedonian 
authorities. Moreover the EU supported the option of maintaining NATO presence in 
Macedonia, beyond the initial given 30-day mandate (Ibid). 
Conclusively it becomes evident to us that the EU played a role in pressuring the Macedonian 
government to achieve the peace agreement and a platform for political reforms. Based on the 
section above, we are convinced that the EU amongst other actors, were instrumental in 
resolving the Macedonian conflict. 
In the following section we will emphasize how Germany was involved in pushing for EU to 
resolve the Macedonian crisis. This section will reveal whether Germany contributed to 
Europeanize EU Foreign & Security Policy, via the Macedonian conflict. 
 
German involvement in Macedonia conflict 
Due to the German history of war, many believe that Germany has avoided or hesitated to use 
military force when needed. However in the period between 2001-2006 Germany 
demonstrated a more active role in influencing international affairs (Gross, 2009, p.122). 
Gerhard Schroder, the former Bundeskanzler of Germany envisioned Germany to undertake 
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increasing military responsibility and become a more influential player on world affairs (Gross, 
2009, p.123). The Macedonian conflict was a sensitive issue to Germany, not only  because of 
the previous experiences in Balkan in which the EU failed to act, but also due to the 
destabilizing effect it would have on the region. The Germans feared that refugee flows were 
immense if the conflict was not to be resolved. Despite the prior Balkan failure the German 
leaders looked towards the EU CFSP to resolve the issue and regarded this channel as key in 
the political process of achieving a peace agreement (Ibid). The Germans regarded the CFSP 
as a natural institutional venue for resolving the crisis, which was stressed repeatedly by the 
Former Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. They both 
publically stated that their support in favor of EU unity and for the EU CFSP to take a leading 
role in the political negotiation of the Macedonian conflict (Gross, 2009, p.125). In addition the 
former German Foreign Minister made several visits to Macedonia to ensure that the EU 
CFSP negotiation positions were achieved and materialized through the eventual Ohrid 
agreement (Ibid). In the German government there seemed to exist a broad consensus on the 
necessity for Germany to push EU in to achieving a political solution to the Macedonian 
conflict.  Joschka Fischer stated that the resolution of the crisis lied with the Europeans and it 
was Europe’s role to develop the common foreign & security policy. A politician from the 
Christian Democrats (CDU) stressed the importance of EU and NATO coming together and 
developing a political concept for the negotiations. A politician from the Free Democrats was 
convinced that it was Germany’s responsibility to shape European security (Ibid). Both 
Gerhard Schröder and Joschka Fischer framed the crisis in Macedonia as key to European 
security and termed it a test case for the emerging EU CFSP (Gross, 2009, p.126). 
 
Germany Europeanizing EU via the Macedonian conflict? 
The prior section emphasizes how the EU was one of the instrumental actors in forcing the 
Macedonian actors in conflict to negotiate and eventually sign a peace agreement. We argue 
in favor of EU’s importance, by looking at the influential tools the EU used to threaten the 
Macedonian government. Germany was an EU member state who repeatedly voiced the 
importance for the EU to push the Macedonian actors in to achieving a peace agreement. The 
then-Bundeskanzler Schröder and Foreign Minister Fischer both stated the importance of EU 
to resolve the crisis. Fischer identified the Macedonian crisis as threatening to European 
security. Moreover there existed a consensus within domestic German politics, in favor of the 
EU to resolve the Macedonian crisis. As already mentioned a politician even expressed that it 
was the responsibility of Germany to resolve the conflict. Furthermore the former 
Bundeskanzler envisioned that Germany would undertake more military responsibility and 
become more active in world affairs. The above mentioned serves as proof to the fact that 
Germany wanted to resolve the Macedonian crisis as soon as possible. One might question 
whether their motives were based genuine concern for Macedonia or based purely on the 
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motivation of securing German security. The fear of possible refugee flows indicates that their 
concern was mainly based on securing European and German security. However the relevant 
issue is that Germany pointed towards the EU CFSP as the institutional venue, in resolving the 
Macedonian crisis. 
The former Foreign Minister Fischer labeled the Macedonian crisis a “test case” for the CFSP 
and thus Germany pointed towards the EU to resolve the crisis, despite prior Balkan failure. 
The fact that there seemed to exist a broad German political consensus, in favor of using the 
EU as a channel to resolve the crisis testifies to the fact that EU involvement in Macedonia 
was a politically broad supported German wish. Therefore we do not hesitate in concluding 
that EU involvement in Macedonia was a firm German political standpoint. The German wish 
of EU involvement in Macedonia implies that Germany applied a bottom-up Europeanization 
process. We have chosen not to focus on other member states, however we can conclude that 
EU involvement was a German wish of foreign and security policy, which was brought to the 
EU level channelized by the institutional venue of CFSP. The German aim was to sustain 
European and German security, and therefore a Macedonian solution was necessary. 
We are convinced that this is an example of bottom-up Europeanization, as it is Germany who 
attempts to upload its preferences to EU level and hereby influence EU policy. The German 
wish of the EU to resolve the Macedonian crisis, gives us firm reason to believe that this is an 
example of Germany attempting to shape EU policy. This is accordance with the 
Europeanization approach of bottom-up which is defined by member states attempting to 
shape EU policy. The fact that the German Foreign Minister along with EU officials, made 
several trips to Skopje, furthermore supports our conclusion that Germany attempted to upload 
their preferences and hence attempt to shape EU politics.      
 
Franco-German Declaration from Paris, 2012 
Our second document and the last part of the analysis proving German willingness to establish 
strong and Europeanized Common Foreign and Security Defense Policy under the European 
Union is a recent declaration from Germany and France. The document was published after 
meeting between French and German representations on the 6th of February 2012, at the 
Franco-German Ministerial Council in Paris. The Council is launched regularly on the 
anniversary of the signature of the 1963 Élysée Treaty. This treaty started the Franco-German 
cooperation, as we already mentioned in our theory part dedicated to the German foreign 
affairs development (auswaertiges-amt.de, 2013). 
 
Initially, we wish to discover what the document contains precisely. Generally the document 
consists of four parts where each of them is dedicated to a slightly different aspect of the 
Franco-German cooperation in regard to the European Union and CFSP. We see a variety of 
proposals and future plans within every chapter of the paper. 
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These vary for insistence from improving and widening European security to the extent of 
promises on consulting national foreign affairs interests and adopting compromised strategies 
into German and French foreign policies (Franco-German Declaration, 2012). 
 
To start with the content of the document, we are introduced to the two allies who agree on 
having a shared will to contribute to the European defense and security with their own tools 
and instruments that have been established during years of alliance. The two countries also 
assure the European Union and its members that they will carry out the necessary actions to 
promote and deepen integration of all member countries in this field as they already have 
certain experiences with convergence of policies. Furthermore, we see in this document a 
promise of even better cooperation between Germany and France in the terms of security. We 
need to stress that by this declaration these two call for intensifying the process of building 
European security and defense structures as they emphasize the reality of new threats and 
risks within the world, therefore they call for approvals of developing policy departments and 
programs (Franco-German Declaration, 2012). 
Moreover the declaration refers to the importance of the Lisbon Treaty as a great opportunity 
for advancing the CFSP while on the other hand the states recognize the role of the North 
Atlantic Alliance as a security organization with significant influence and specific relations with 
the EU. This has been described in our brief introduction to the CFSP development in the 
theoretical chapter. Nevertheless, Germany and France express their awareness of the 
economic situation in the present world and therefore they advocate the importance of 
ensuring common European responsibility for its own security. Furthermore the EU is informed 
throughout this declaration that Germany and France wish to run foreign missions under 
CFSP. Moreover, promotion of new missions is mentioned in the documents (Franco-German 
Declaration, 2012). 
 
Last but not least, the document emphasizes the advantage of France and Germany already 
having several experiences and sort of converged security policy with regard to the historical 
events mentioned in the German theory section based on Dirk´s book. This previous 
cooperation is seen as an advantage in terms that Franco-German ally ship could be the basis 
for further efficient development of European security. As long as the Franco-German 
partnership includes even common development, they propose the usage of their innovations 
at the European level (Franco-German Declaration, 2012). 
Even though the declaration is produced by both states we will focus only about on Germany 
as this is our limitation of research area. 
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In the opening paragraph of the declaration we see a statement that Germany is “…firmly 
committed to strengthening European security and defense…” (Franco-German Declaration, 
2012, p.1). Germany and France have negotiated about such advancing of European policy 
for a long time, however they do not wish to undermine the influence of NATO. We hereby see 
a proposal on strengthening the CFSP, which according to Olsen is an attempt of introducing 
Europeanization. We have chosen two of his approaches which we believe suit our example 
the most. In this specific statement we recognize the first one, development of institution at the 
European level. To be concrete, we find the proclamation of further strengthening as an 
attempt of a member state trying to solve an European problem. 
Additionally, we can see an intention to introduce Europeanization into CFSP in terms of the 
German and French delegations negotiated and consulted this specific policy.  
In relation to our theory we find this to be a clear sign of will to cooperate and promote 
common approaches and strategies. We argue that as long as Germany is willing to consult its 
foreign policy with France, it is also willing to share the competencies with the rest of the 
member states. We are convinced that it can be proved by the Olsen´s approach as well, as 
we assume that Germany considers cooperation to be a better mean of establishing CFSP 
rather than working separately.  
Moreover, with regard to Gross we see a legacy to the historical evolution of both German 
and/or European security. Gross points out that Germany stressed the recognition of the role 
of NATO, who is being described as leading actor in security in the past. Germany played a 
somewhat   mediator role between NATO and the EU and we therefore assume that by 
expressing the refusal to undermine NATO, Germany follows its prior role between the EU and 
NATO. 
The next statement form the declaration refers to German plans for further strengthening of 
CFSP. German representatives declares to do so by implementing the conclusions of the 
December 2011 EU Foreign Affairs Council. Furthermore, Germany volunteers as a promoter 
of the implementation. Running the ongoing and future EU military and civilian missions is 
included as well as the assumed future responsibility for Balkan region (Franco-German 
Declaration, 2012, p. 1-2).  
This is an interesting aspect as from the Cini´s theory we know that the Council is exercising 
bottom-up Europeanization on the basis of its national members and how they represent 
national interests on the grounds of the Council. In addition, the fact that Germany suggests 
that it will take over the responsibility for pushing integration in this field forward shows 
according to de Flers the characteristics of the  bottom-up Europeanization approach. From 
the theory we know that bottom-up effect of the Europeanization is exercised when a state 
attempts to upload their preferences and shape EU politics. In the declaration it is stated that 
the EU in future will take full responsibility of securing stability and security in the region of 
Balkan. Here we wish to add the other Olsen approach, the central penetration of national 
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system of governance. This states that the member state, in order to remain competitive, 
should stay as close as possible to EU policy. We apply this to the German suggestion as it 
would enable member states to run the EU missions and interventions. By doing so we 
conclude that Germany wishes to become an integration promoter in order to be the closest to 
CFSP and eventually have the best position for exporting national preferences. 
We are convinced that clear proof of the German advocation for Europeanization of CFSP can 
be seen in following paragraph: “In times of strategic uncertainty and limited resources 
strengthened defense requires common procurement. As a consequence we must be ready to 
take the necessary decisions.” (Franco-German Declaration, 2012, p.2). From our point of 
view Germany calls for negotiations within the EU in what we recognize as the bottom-up 
effect, as it is being described by Cini. On the other hand, we are facing a clash between two 
descriptions of Europeanization because since the proposal from Germany calls for interaction 
and mutual discussion on the EU level with participation of all Member states, we argue that it 
could be described as cross-loading Europeanization as well. The theory of Cini states that 
cross-loading Europeanization also means that the role of the member states is to participate 
on the policy-making by expressing their opinions to be further discussed. Additionally, this 
calls for further integration throughout readiness to take decisions is relatable to the 
“development of institutions on the EU level” approach. We argue so since we recognize a 
clear proposal on cooperation made by using words such as “common procurement”.  
This again complies with the theory that states tend to interact rather than to act solely, 
because the efficiency as higher. 
Further initiative representing national interest is reflected in the fact that Germany advocates 
for supporting instruments for CFSP, for instance the European Defense Agency. In addition, 
Germany proposes a “…civil-military planning and conduct capability.” (Franco-German 
Declaration, 2012, p.2). From what we know from de Fleurs´s book we suppose that this is a 
direct example of bottom-up Europeanization with regard to our theory on the different 
approaches of Europeanization. 
German willingness to coordinate and Europeanize its own foreign policy is on the other hand 
visible as well. From the part of document which refers to previous consulting of options with 
its partners before launching an action, it is obvious that Germany wishes to have 
Europeanized national policy (Franco-German Declaration, 2012, p. 3). Therefore we assume 
it is a clear evidence of the will to Europeanize CFSP. To make it clear we argue that when a 
state accepts to sacrifice its national policy, it indisputably welcomes Europeanization in 
CFSP, as well. Here we identify the top-down Europeanization which de Flers characterizes as 
the EU triggers domestic change and makes the member states adopt EU policy. However, in 
this context we would talk more likely about socializing of the German foreign policy as this 
process is described under the competences of the Commission in our theory. Since we see a 
will to share, consult and compromise national policy with other member states before taking 
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further action, it is qualified as socializing by Graziano. Therefore we see that socializing is not 
only on the grounds of the Commission, but it may appear on different EU levels and 
institutions. 
 
To sum up the analysis of the Franco-German Declaration we need to recall the main 
arguments that foster the validity of our theory as we understand it. We have witnessed that 
Germany called for strengthening of the CFSP and further establishment of supportive 
structures and programs within it. As stated before we recognize the principles of bottom-up 
Europeanization in relation to this. Moreover Germany showed a will to further strengthen 
CFSP and increase its own capacities, whereas we identify a possibility of implementing 
German values into EU policies. 
However, we have reached a conclusion that certain statements in the document were 
explicable with more parts of our theories. Moreover, we saw a clash between usage of a 
bottom-up and cross-loading approach in Europeanization. This has left us with a sense of 
confusion towards the description of different Europeanization approaches, caused by the 
theoretical differences between the authors de Flers, Cini and Graziano. Therefore, we admit 
that Olsen has a point when he asks whether Europeanization is sufficient to answer the 
questions of modern political development. However, we conclude that it is necessary to pay 
even more attention to the study of Europeanization processes, and in particular the 
Europeanization process of cross loading which we see applied to several areas of analysis.  
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CONCLUSION 
In order to answer our problem formulation “Has Germany participated in the Europeanization 
of CFSP”, we have initially witnessed the German attempts to develop CFSP through a 
number of proposals within the joint letter addressed to the EU. Firstly, Germany has tried to 
develop CFSP by proposing that it should establish a joint working unit, which will represent 
the collaboration between nationals and the union. According to Olsen (2007), this 
collaboration process indicates the member states willingness to Europeanize EU policies 
through top-down effect. Secondly, Germany has tried to Europeanize CFSP by proposing that 
the EU, along with the states, should be more involved in CFSP shaping. Moreover, this 
involvement should cover specific matters for facilitating the CFSP decision-making 
processes. According to Olsen (2007) again, this implies the German attempt to dissolve likely 
problematic aspects of the foreign policy and thus develop it further. Finally, we have seen that 
the country had suggested to establish a single CFSP image that would be easily recognized. 
Referring to Cini and Borragan (2010), this intention implies the country’s readiness to 
Europeanize CFSP. It should be mentioned that such a figure was installed in 2011, and we 
can conclude that Germany was partly instrumental in addressing the lacking issue of a 
Foreign Policy Chief. In conclusion, we have learned that Germany tried to further 
Europeanize the CFSP by means of the initiative proposed in the joint letter. 
 
Assessing the Berlin Plus agreements we come to the conclusion that the process of 
Europeanization is evident as proved through the dynamic highlighted by Alecu de Flers and 
Müller. Using the influence of the EU presidency, Germany has tried to impact EU level politics 
by uploading their preferences to EU level. This was due to through this strong and influential 
position hosting the EU presidency. That strengthens the level of intergovernmentalism in 
which Germany was one of the key actors. Specifically the Berlin Plus arrangements enabled 
the EU to make use of NATO assets and thus empowered EU foreign policy capabilities. We 
believe that Germany exercised a bottom-up approach by uploading their preferences and 
shaping EU level politics.  
Eventually, we reached a conclusion on the Franco-German Declaration. We argue that with 
use of the theory we have proved that Germany still wishes to Europeanize CFSP. To justify 
our findings we will emphasize the key arguments. First of all, we saw a proposal on 
strengthening CFSP. This proposal proves Europeanization attempts in according to Olsen´s 
theory. It is applicable in a way that Germany is trying to solve emerging an EU problem with 
national initiative and preference of cooperation rather than separate action. Moreover, the 
declaration stresses, that Germany voluntarily offers its tool for European purposes. We 
argued that bottom-up Europeanization can be traced here as Germany suggests usage of 
common instruments. Additionally, Germany would remain very close to the decision-making 
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process by importing its structures under EU, and this is exactly what Olsen relates to 
Europeanization. Furthermore Germany brings up new policy by requesting for responsibility 
over Balkan in order secure stability in the region. 
This matches the bottom-up Europeanization from de Flers. The cross-loading 
Europeanization is being present here as long as Germany clearly states that a mutual 
discussion is required. Finally, the German intention to push forward supportive agendas of 
increasing the responsibility sphere of EU foreign policy, testifies to the fact that Germany 
attempts to further develop the CFSP and hereby lauds reiterates the notion that Germany 
attempted to Europeanize the CFSP. 
Finally, we believe that we successfully applied Europeanization theory on every statement 
from the declaration. Moreover we assume that from the match between the theory and 
German proposals we can claim that Germany is willing to create Europeanized foreign policy. 
Therefore the analysis leaves us convinced that Germany advocates and actively participates 
in Europeanization of CFSP.  
We have witnessed how the EU was influential in pushing the Macedonian involved actors to 
reach a peace agreement. As shown in the analysis, we believe that Germany was a member 
state who persistently pushed for the EU to resolve the Macedonian crisis. The former 
Bundeskanzler of Germany and the former foreign Minister both publically stated the 
importance of EU to resolve the crisis. Moreover it was widely agreed across the domestic 
politics of Germany, that Germany needed to push the EU to resolve the crisis. We are 
therefore convinced that EU involvement in Macedonia was broadly supported by the German 
politicians. In the analysis we have emphasized how Germany pointed towards the institutional 
venue of the CFSP to resolve crisis. Germany trusted the EU to resolve the crisis, despite the 
prior Balkan failure. Furthermore the Macedonian crisis was described as test case for the 
CFSP. As highlighted in the analysis, the EU managed to push the involved Macedonian 
actors into signing a peace treaty, and hereby satisfy the German demand of solving the crisis. 
Based on the various statements made by the influential German politicians, we conclude that 
Germany attempted to shape EU level policy. It is evident that Germany attempted to push the 
EU into solving the crisis, and hereby uploaded their national preferences to EU level politics. 
We come to the conclusion that this is a vivid example of the bottom-up Europeanization 
approach, as it is Germany who attempts to influence EU politics, by pushing EU to solve the 
Macedonian crisis.  
Above all we have witnessed how the various German initiatives can be argued as further 
developing the EU foreign policy and hereby contribute to the Europeanization of the CFSP. 
Based on the mentioned examples above, we believe that we have argued and proved if and 
how Germany has actively contributed in Europeanizing the CFSP. We acknowledge the fact 
that there might exist a clash of Europeanization approaches, due to the different authors and 
flexible definitions. Moreover we believe that the combined Europeanization approach 
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deserves further studies, as it could be applied to different aspects of European level politics. 
Nevertheless we intend to answer our problem formulation, and based on the German posed 
initiatives we come to the conclusion that Germany has contributed actively in Europeanizing 
the CFSP, particularly by the Europeanization approach of Bottom-up.  
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